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INTRODUCTION
Spain, or unsolicited commercial email,' drastically lowers the costs of
advertising directly to prospective consumers by exploiting open electronic
mail protocols. And it has become an obnoxious big business. Markets, norms,
and technological measures 2 have all failed to change sufficiently the
economics of the spain business model. Spare is clogging businesses' servers
and users' inboxes, and costing too much money and time in return for too little
benefit. This Note argues that despite widespread criticism, current federal
spain law has in fact effectively targeted the most egregious senders. But it has
also created an entitlement to send spam--one free message-before a
recipient's wish to avoid spain must be honored. This reverses the entitlement
set in other media and ignores consumer demand for privacy and a Do-Not-Call
Registry for email.
Part I of this Note describes spain, its scale, and its costs and benefits. Part
II analyzes attempts to use the market and state legislation to fix the problem. It
explains why these efforts failed, and why federal legislation was required. Part
III outlines the successes of CAN-SPAM, the groundbreaking federal spain
law, as well as the interlocking set of state laws used to combat spainmers. Part
IV compares spain law to policies addressing unsolicited commercial speech in
other media and proposes a policy suggested in CAN-SPAM, but ultimately
overlooked: a Do-Not-Call Registry for email. This Note concludes that a Do-
Not-Spain Registry balances the easy detection of a strict liability rule with the
t Yale Law School, J.D. expected May 2006, registered patent agent. The author would like to
thank Alvin Klevorick, Ian Ayres, Jack Balkin, James Grimmelmann, Adam Stubblefield, and Ira
Rubenstein with Microsoft Legal Counsel for their help on this piece. This Note was made possible by
Microsoft Corporation's generous support of the Yale Information Society Project.
I. Spain is defined in this Note as any unsolicited commercial email. There are many definitions of
spare, from annoying forwards by friends to an email volume reaching numeric thresholds. This Note
views sparn as any unsolicited advertisement email. This Note also analyzes sparn as commercial
speech, making non-commercial spare, though annoying, beyond the scope of this Note. For a
discussion of political spare, see Seth Grossman, Note, Keeping Unwanted Donkeys and Elephants Out
of Your Inbox: The Case for Regulating Political Spam, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1533 (2004). Spam-
style communications in other media, including SMS spam, VolP spam (spit), and instant messaging
spam (spim), are increasingly problematic, but this Note will confine itself to email spam.
2. See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998).
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speech freedoms safeguarded by an opt-out system.
I. WHY EVERYONE HATES SPAM
Spam was the invention of a group of crafty immigration lawyers, who
bombarded some 2600 unrelated Usenet newsgroups with electronic
advertising in 1994.3 The term "spam" was inspired by a Monty Python skit
about a restaurant in which a group of Vikings drowns out all conversation by
repeating "Spam! , and while Hormel Foods sometimes insists on protecting
its SPAM trademark,5 spam is now widely used to refer to junk email.
While spam has been a nuisance since the earliest days of electronic mail,
in recent years it has become a mission-critical problem that can take down
entire companies' mail servers, spread viruses, compromise systems, and
overwhelm frustrated users. This Part assesses those costs, bearing in mind that
some spam does have value to recipients, and that that value must be
considered in any spam policy proposal.
A. Externalized Costs
The fundamental problem with spam is that it externalizes costs to millions
of uninterested users. Anyone who uses email has encountered unsolicited
advertisements in his inbox. Spammers (or, more politely, direct email
marketers), sell all kinds of products using unsolicited emails containing
hyperlinks that, when clicked, bring customers to a website storefront selling
goods and services of varying quality and authenticity. E-commerce (now just
commerce) often depends on the same tools. For example, Amazon.com also
has a website storefront, promotional email, and transactional email, but
spanmers use a different kind of marketing plan to reach millions of unwitting
consumers. While data-mining technology would allow super-customized
spam,6 most spain has taken the opposite strategy, indiscriminately lobbing
literally millions of cheap emails at unwitting recipients. Even the most
targeted spain is intentionally overbroad, to avoid missing a potential buyer.
Spam is made possible by the architecture of email, which, while intended
3. KEVIN J. CONNOLLY, LAW OF INTERNET SECURITY AND PRIVACY 367 (2004).
4. CONNOLLY, supra note 3, at 367. The skit has now been incorporated into a Broadway musical,
which ironically suffered security problems in the form of leaked email addresses of parties who signed
up for information. David F. Gallagher, "hat To Expect of 'Spamalot'?A Lot of Spam, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2005, at B9.
5. Hormel trademark claims against Spam Arrest, a spain filter, were ineffective. Press Release,
Spam Arrest, Spam Arrest LLC Puts Final Can on Hormel's Spain Trademark Action (May 28, 2004),
available at http://spamarrest.com/pr/releases/20040528.jsp. Hormel's claims against a spammer's
clothing line seem to have fared better. Mark Harrington, Trademark Problems Stall Clothing Line
Aspirations of So-Called Spam King, NEWSDAY, June 17, 2004.
6. Tal Z. Zarsky, "Mine Your Own Business! ": Making the Case for the Implications of the Mining
of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. & TECH. 4 (2003).
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to make email free and accessible, has also created a structure of costs such that
there is little difference between sending a thousand emails or one hundred
million. 7 Spam is thus the price we pay for the Internet's principles of freedom
and universal access.8 The standard mail protocol, SMTP, is based on the
TCP/IP Internet structure. Like these protocols, SMTP was developed as a
collective, free standard to allow for the free flow of information. SMTP is a
"trusting" architecture, meaning it accepts senders' data by default, making it
an easy target for fraud.9 Changing SMTP to require, say, authentication, or a
payment scheme, would be highly disruptive (if not impossible), because open
protocols have no real authority over vendors. As such, change on that scale is
unlikely.10 SMTP itself requires neither authentication nor payment in order to
shuffle an email through several computers until it reaches its destination."i
Spam is further enabled by its low marginal costs. Spammers face some
startup costs: hardware, specialized software, bandwidth, address lists, message
composition, revenue infrastructure, and legal or reputation risk.12 However,
once an operation is equipped to send millions of emails, the marginal cost of
sending a few thousand more emails is quite low-just a bit of bandwidth and
some legal risk.13 The same infrastructure can be used at minimal additional
cost to send millions of emails on behalf of multiple clients.
Email's open architecture and low marginal costs thus combine to create a
forgiving cost structure. A spanmer can make money with as low as a 0.005%
response rate, 14 or even a 0.000005% response rate,' 5 compared with the almost
2% response rate required of direct mailings and the 8.55% response rate
required in telemarketing. 16 As self-proclaimed spare king Alan Ralsky has
bragged: "When you're sending out 250 million e-mails, even a blind squirrel
will find a nut." 17 This strategy of sheer bulk is of course impossible in physical
space, where ads are often carefully chosen and designed for intended
7. Reduction in Distribution of Spain Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2214 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3 (2003) (statement of Rep. Coble).
8. Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Scott).
9. Derek E. Bambauer, Solving the Inbox Paradox: An Information-Based Policy Approach to
Unsolicited E-mail Advertising, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 15-17 (2005).
10. Id. at 17-19. It is sometimes possible, however, for parties to adopt new protocols without
consensus. See infra note 66.
11. It is possible to add some authentication features without modifying SMTP itself. For example,
SPF authentication, discussed infra note 66, modifies the SMTP server and not the SMTP protocol.
12. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 20-22.
13. ROBERT B. GELMAN ET AL., PROTECTING YOURSELF ONLINE 124 (1998) (blaming "virtually no
incremental cost" for the volume of spam).
14. Mike France, Needed Now: Laws To Can Spam, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Sept. 26, 2002,
http://www.businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/sep2002/sb20020926_5958.htm.
15. See Tim Madigan, There Are 10 Million Reasons Why You Hate This Man, FT. WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM, Apr. 27, 2003, at 1G.
16. DIRECT MARKETING AGENCY, DMA RATE REPORT 12 (2005) (on file with author).
17. Mike Wendland, Spam King Lives Large Off Others' E-Mail Trouble, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Nov. 22, 2002, at IA.
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consumers. (Even seemingly haphazard postal bulk mailings are targeted; a
mailing campaign would never, for example, send millions of pieces of mail to
addresses that do not even exist, a common occurrence in the world of spam. 18)
On the other hand, costs to both users and Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) 19 are more substantial: bandwidth, hardware, software (filtering),
message processing at the ISP and user level, risk to reputation and users from
fraudulent spam, and the non-trivial psychological harm of email degradation
and offensive email.2° Spam senders, of course, do not compensate users and
ISPs for these expenses.21 Spam, which is estimated to make up eighty percent
of email traffic,22 costs American businesses somewhere between $17 and
$21.6 billion each year.23 Mail providers now spend $1 billion a year on
filtering alone,24 and users spend an average of three minutes a day deleting
25spam.
26Email is now becoming frustrating for many users. In other media, we are
exposed to invasive, unwanted advertisements every day---on television, radio,
or even on standard websites. A key difference between span and these more
traditional unwanted advertisements is that the latter pay for some good, such
as the content of a broadcast. 27 One can also avoid them by simply not tuning
in. Spam, however, is unwanted speech that a receiver must either receive or
pay not to receive by paying for filters. Just as few postal customers would
accept a COD advertisement, few, if any, users of spain find its value worth the
18. S. REP. NO. 108-102, at 3 (2003); JEREMY POTEET, CANNING SPAM: YOU'VE GOT MAIL (THAT
You DON'T WANT) 21-24 (2004). Targeted physical mailing campaigns are also based on sophisticated
location demographic data. See MARK MONMONIER, SPYING WITH MAPS: SURVEILLANCE
TECHNOLOGIES AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY 6-11 (2002).
19. Not all mail providers are ISPs, so this terminology is not exact. A user's ISP does not have to
correlate to her email provider; for example, a major ISP in New Haven is Comcast, but a user's email
address could be through Hotmail, Yahoo, or even Yale. In this Note, the term ISP will be used to refer
to any service provider that provides mail to users.
20. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 22-25.
21. A compensation system has been proposed both for email, see infra Part III, as well as for
telemarketing. See Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2003).
22. Tom Zeller, Jr., Law Barring Junk E-Mail Allows a Flood Instead, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at
Al.
23. See 2004 NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY READINESS SURVEY: SUMMARY REPORT 5 (2005),
http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/ntrs/NTRS_2004.pdf (calculating $21.8 billion cost to businesses);
DEBORAH FALLOWS, SPAM: How IT Is HURTING EMAIL AND DEGRADING LIFE ON THE INTERNET 7
(2003), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPSpam-Report.pdf (citing cost estimates of
$10 to $87 billion).
24. Jon Swarz, Anti-Spam Industry Consolidating Fewer Vendors To Offer Broader Service Range,
USA TODAY, July 20, 2004, at 2B.
25. 2004 NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY READINESS SURVEY, supra note 23. Twelve percent of users
spend half an hour or more dealing with spam. FALLOWS, supra note 23, at 16.
26. Twenty-five percent of users have decreased their use of email because of spam. FALLOWS,
supra note 23, at 1; see also James McNair, From the Stockroom to the Boardroom, It's Paralyzing All
Facets of Business, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 16, 2003, at ID.
27. YocHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION CHANGES
MARKETS AND FREEDOM (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 179-80, on file with author) (discussing
advertising-based funding of media in democracies).
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price. In fact, some users are willing to pay two dollars per mailbox per month
to filter it.28 AOL, for example, now deletes some eighty percent of incoming
mail to its subscribers.29 And spam is especially invasive to recipients because
it is both a "push" communication like telemarketing, 30 and also (unlike
browsing web pages on the Internet 31) has the capacity to be a one-to-many
communication, like television.
32
The time costs in dealing with spam as unwanted speech are burdensome to
users. Stumbling across, say, a Barbie billboard or an anti-Barbie protest
website during an Internet search for Barbies is very different than spending
three minutes a day scraping ads for Barbies off your mailbox. Assuming that
the average user spends three minutes a day, or ninety minutes a month,
deleting spam, and using a conservative estimate of $11.00 per hour for a
consumer's time,33 she spends $16.50 a month, or $200.75 a year, dealing with
spam. Not only does this cost represent a severe degradation of the medium of
email, spam is also all-too-often offensive,34 fraudulent,35 or infected with
viruses. 
36
B. Valuing Spam As Speech
Though spam has extraordinary external costs, some spam does confer
benefits. Users sometimes find spam informative and buy products advertised
by it. A 2004 poll showed that about four percent of email users say they have
made purchases because of spam and fully fourteen percent do read it.37 One to
six percent of spam emails results in a clickthrough-that is, a link clicked on
28. S. REP. No. 108-102, at 6(2003).
29. Id. at 2.
30. A listener initiates a pull communication (newspaper) but not a push communication
(telemarketing). A one-to-one communication is an interaction between one speaker and one listener
(telephone); a one-to-many communication is the broadcast model (television). Spam is a push
communication. Khaldoun Shobaki, Speech Restraints for Converged Media, 52 UCLA L. REV. 333,
360-361 (2004). However, spain is usually not a one-to-one communication like telemarketing, making
Shobaki's discussion of spam as similar to telemarketing somewhat misleading.
31. Paul Ganley, Access to the Individual: Digital Rights Management Systems and the
Intersection of Informational and Decision Privacy Interests, 10 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 241, 261
(2002) (discussing cookies); Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries in the Age of
Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1653, 1668-69 (1998) (discussing email).
32. Joseph J. Celia III & John Reed Stark, Securities Regulation and the Internet, 520 PLU/PAT 793,
806 (1998).
33. Michael A. Fisher, The Right To Spam?: Regulating Electronic Junk Mail, 23 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. & ARTS 363, 375 (2000).
34. Seventy-six percent of users are bothered by offensive or obscene spam. FALLOWS, supra note
23, at 27. See also FED. TRADE COMM'N, FALSE CLAIMS IN SPAM 12-13 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/spam/030429spamreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC FRAUD REPORT].
35. FTC FRAUD REPORT, supra note 34, at 3-10.
36. POSTINI, INC., 2005 EMAIL SECURITY ANNUAL REVIEW AND THREAT REPORT 16 (2005),
available at http://www.postini.com/whitepapers/.
37. 2004 NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY READINESS SURVEY, supra note 23.
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by a user. 38 Finally, there is a more abstract informational value in unwanted
speech, even commercial speech, as part of the marketplace of ideas.
39
Because spam is a broad category, containing both the best and worst
innovations in unwanted speech, it is challenging to quantify its value. Some
spam has no value whatsoever in the marketplace of speech. Fraudulent speech,
for one, is unprotected and makes no progress toward the truth,40 and an
estimated forty percent of spam contains fraud in the message body, while
forty-four percent contains fraud in either the "From" or "Subject" lines.41 The
most permissive view of unwanted speech would perhaps allow this kind of
speech but never support its value to a duped, paying recipient. Other kinds of
spam are intentionally malicious. "Phishing" tricks users into disclosing
personal data by pretending to come from a reputable company, while virus-
42laden spam attempts to damage users' property. This kind of email is
malicious fraud with no value to any recipients. The remaining spam is
unrequested advertising, and of course even this last category of spam is a far
cry from the truth-seeking unwanted speech Justice Holmes contemplated in
the marketplace of unwanted speech.4 3
The value of spam also depends upon the recipient. Some unwanted speech
may be valuable to a few, but may be so offensive to others that the costs far
outweigh the benefits. Graphic advertising for pornographic and medicinal
products is often deeply offensive to some users, who view themselves as
victims of what others might see as merely titillating speech.44 Even when the
content-such as cures for erectile dysfunction-is freely discussed in
traditional media, spam seems to render it more offensive.45 In one particularly
38. Alan Ralsky, a reclusive spammer, disclosed a less than one percent clickthrough rate in his
only media interview. Wendland, supra note 17. Industry results can be up to six percent. Kris Oser,
Date.com Moves Away From E-mail, DIRECT, July 1, 2003, at 9.
39. Bambauer, supra note 9 (arguing for the informational value of spam); Note, The Impermeable
Life: Unsolicited Communications in the Marketplace of Ideas, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1314 (2005). But see
Fisher, supra note 33 (arguing commercial speech in spam should be entitled to little First Amendment
protection).
40. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600 (2003) (ruling
fraudulent practices in fundraising are not protected speech).
41. FTC FRAUD REPORT, supra note 34, at 7-8.
42. Research suggests that 1.15% of email contains viruses. POSTINI, INC., supra note 36, at 16.
43. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."); see
also Note, HARV. L. REV., supra note 39, at 1333-34 ("The fact that most people associate these
communications with ads for penis enlargement or mortgage refinancing undercuts any sense of vitality
these communications may have as part of the marketplace of ideas."). See generally C. Edwin Baker,
Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandry in Nike, 54 CASE W.
REs. L. REV. 1161 (2004) (discussing other speech advocates' skepticism of commercial speech claims).
44. Rob Zom, Dealing With Disgusting Spam, ACTRIX NEWSLETTER (Actrix Networks Ltd.,
Wellington, N.Z.), Jan. 2003, available at http://editor.actrix.co.nzfbyarticle/dwdspam.htm.
45. Chris Becker, Spain is the Best Thing in My Life Right Now, ADVANCE-TITAN (Univ. of Wis.-
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graphic example, a testicular cancer survivor was so offended by an ad for
penis enlargement pills that he threatened to kill the president of the marketing
company after the company continued sending him messages after repeated
opt-out requests; he committed suicide after he was criminally charged.4 6 When
the content is not available in traditional media, the effects are more negative.
About seventeen percent of spam contains automatically displayed adult
images, and forty-one percent of these messages have misleading sender or
S11I i jt ;nfrrmnt;nt 47 V~t nth~r enam t-nntn nffi~ncivim nrnfillo'te nr rnntpnt
from gambling to textual pornography. The indiscriminate scope of spam
means this kind of material can offend adults, subject workplaces to legal
liability48 or, worse, fall into the inboxes of children and young adults.49 Since
spam is a "push," one-to-many communication, even when offensive speech
may have great value to some, the remainder's disgust at the communication
may make it inefficient.
Some span does have higher value, such as highly specialized advertising
catering to specific interests. For example, in the aftermath of Terry Schiavo's
front page right-to-die controversy, her parents sold a valuable ($500 a month)
4000-address list of "compassionate pro-lifers" who had donated to their legal
effort. 50 Targeted spam is probably more valuable to recipients because it is
carefully chosen, but it is also particularly threatening to the privacy of those
who, for example, innocently gave their email addresses to Terry Schiavo's
parents.
51
The solution this Note proposes to these concerns about offensive,
destructive, or invasive mail is to allow readers to self-select a domain, and opt
out of communications they find offensive or annoying before that first
message arrives.
II. FAILED SOLUTIONS
The market has made Herculean efforts, both technical and legal, to block
Oshkosh), Feb. 16, 2005, available at http://www.advancetitan.com/story.asp?issue=1 1117&story
=3630 ("[T]elevised spam uses images that hint at what their product is for because there are obviously
standards of decency, and commercials for penis pills can't show graphic before-and-after pictures.").
46. Dan Pulcrano, Death by Internet: Charles Booher Fought the Spam, and the Spam Won,
METRO (Silicon Valley), Jan 26, 2005, available at http://www.metroactive.com/papers/metro/
01.26.05/booher-0504.html.
47. FTC FRAUD REPORT, supra note 34, at 14.
48. Declan McCullagh, Porn Spain-Legal Minefield for Employers, NEWS.COM, Apr. 7, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2100-1032-995658.html.
49. Press Release, Symantec, Symantec Survey Reveals More Than 80 Percent of Children Using
Email Report Receive Inappropriate Spam Daily (June 9, 2003), available at http://www.symantec.com/
press/2003/n030609a.html.
50. David D. Kirkpatrick & John Schwartz, List of Schiavo Donors Will Be Sold By Direct-
Marketing Firm, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at A10.
51. See generally Ganley, supra note 31, at 250-62 (discussing privacy interests in many kinds of
internet communications).
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spam. This Part chronicles those efforts and argues that, while effective, these
measures were insufficient. Indeed, the difficulty of circumventing technical
safeguards has encouraged senders to send mail ever more cleverly. Early legal
actions proved not to be strong enough: ISPs lacked the appropriate legal tools
to collect the judgments they did win. Moreover, early spam laws were poorly
tailored and just not strong enough to respond to the tricks of spammers. This
Part discusses these efforts by the market and the lessons learned.
A. Non-Legal Solutions
Though the market alone has failed to stop spam, it has made an amazing
and costly array of attempts to do so. Because ISPs and users bear the costs of
spain advertising, they have always had financial and reputational incentives to
change the economics of sparn. These market-implemented solutions, briefly
and incompletely outlined here, have evolved to delete the majority of
unwanted mail, created the largest blacklists in history, executed large vigilante
campaigns, and caused both competition and cooperation as ISPs work to ease
their burden.
It is ISPs who face the complaints of consumers who hold them responsible
for routing spain they had no part in producing. 52 MSN, for one, claims spam is
a top complaint of its subscribers, 53 and a substantial number of customers
indicate they are willing to switch ISPs if a competitor offers better spain
filtering.54 Because spain has an impact on ISPs' reputations, their equipment,
their customers, and ultimately their bottom line, ISPs have made a great effort
to eliminate spain.
In the 1990s, span was only a small percentage of email traffic, but ISPs
were already working to delete unwanted mail. They were aided by the 1995
decision in Cyber Promotions v. AOL, 55 which denied the so-called right to
spam. A federal district court ruled that AOL's mail system was not like a
company town providing public mail services, but rather more like private
56property; thus AOL could not be forced to route any piece of mail. This gave
ISPs the legal authority to implement filtering and blocking policies. ISPs also
started high-tech, vigilante "bombings," shutting down junk emailers by
52. Reduction in Distribution of Spaie Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2214 Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) (prepared statement of Joseph S. Rubin, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).
53. Brandon Sprague, Microsoft Attacks Spam in Courts, SEATrLE TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at El.
54. Ian Austen, Most Wanted: Drilling Down Spam Protection: A Reason To Switch?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 28, 2004, at C9 (Fourteen percent of dialup and eight percent of broadband users "definitely"
would switch; thirty-three percent of dial-up and thirty-one percent of broadband users "probably"
would switch to an ISP with better spam filtering).
55. 948 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
56. Id.; see also Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(ruling that a website was not a place of public accommodation under the ADA).
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clogging their servers with return notices or other mail.57 More modem
vigilante attacks would strike at the website bandwidth or revenue
infrastructure of junk emailers. AOL now blocks subscribers' access to
suspected spammers' websites.58 Lycos U.K. released a popular screensaver
that would use idle computer time to access spammers' websites and waste
bandwidth. This kind of widespread malicious access is called a distributed
denial of service attack and is almost certainly illegal; Lycos U.K. stopped
U1 Ll I UtLi IoL softJvLrar VVILIIln. k.
Today, ISPs act as private networks with ironclad user agreements allowing
them to delete any mail without notice. The current federal spam law's safe
harbor for ISP mail filtering protects "a policy of declining to transmit, route,
relay, handle, or store certain types of electronic mail messages,' '6 or existing
mail filtering policies. To identify and delete spam, these networks now depend
on sophisticated, expensive filters, from Hotmail's patented Microsoft
SmartScreen filters to the open source SpainAssassin. These filters are the first
line of defense for ISPs; they block, or delete without even storing, a large
percentage of spam. In September 2001, spam was only eight percent of all
email traffic. By May 2003, the largest ISP, AOL, was blocking eighty percent
of daily inbound mail, up from one-third just two months before and one-sixth
in December 2002. In 2003, EarthLink reported a 500% increase in spam traffic
in the previous eighteen months.62 Hotmail estimates that it deletes ninety-five
percent of incoming mail.63 Without these ISP-level filters, many businesses
would lack the capacity to handle all of their mail, not to mention the viruses
and phishing contained in malicious spam.
These filters depend on a range of extralegal innovations. They are
proprietary and intentionally opaque to prevent "work-arounds" by spammers.
Filter specifications are closely guarded secrets and probably vary significantly
between mail systems and over time. Hotmail, for example, uses as a filtering
57. See JAN SAMORISKI, ISSUES IN CYBERSPACE: COMMUNICATION, TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND
SOCIETY ON THE INTERNET FRONTIER 118-19 (2002). Today, this technique has fallen out of vogue
because much server information is falsified, and even if it is not, a large amount of spain comes from
"zombie" computers, personal computers infected with viruses used by spanmers to route mail. Indeed,
over half of spain may come from such hijacked "zombie" computers. Ross Wehner, Hook, Line, and
Sinker Phishers Threaten E-Commerce; Crime Fighters Try To Stop Them, DENVER POST, Dec. 27,
2004, at El.
58. Jonathan Krim, AOL Blocking Links as Anti-Spam Tactic, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 21, 2004, at
A9.
59. Hiawatha Bray, Frontier Justice Won't Stop the Spam, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 2004, at C3.
60. See, e.g., Yahoo! Terms of Service § 6, http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ (last visited Mar. 19,
2006) ("You acknowledge that Yahoo! may or may not pre-screen Content, but that Yahoo! and its
designees shall have the right (but not the obligation) in their sole discretion to pre-screen, refuse, or
move any Content that is available via the Service.").
61. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7707(c) (West Supp. 2005).
62. S. REP. NO. 108-102, at 2-3 (2003).
63. Bill Gates, Preserving and Enhancing the Benefits of Email-A Progress Report (June 28,
2004), http://www.microsoft.com/mscorp/execmailU2004/06-28antispam.asp.
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factor a tracing technique based on sending servers called Sender ID, 64 which is
now forged in the majority of spam.65 SPF records on mail servers list
authorized outgoing IP addresses, but these too have been widely forged.
66
Yahoo! 's identification system, DomainKeys, 67 which uses digital signatures to
authenticate origin, may be more difficult to forge, but requires more
computing power to process.
Despite Cyber Promotions, those who are excluded by terms of service
continue to argue that ISPs should be considered common carriers, and that
their policies are opaque or unfair.68 When ISPs spend millions of dollars
building mission-critical, fragile filters to delete as much mail as quickly as
possible, demands to disclose filtering policies seem at least counter-
productive, if not entirely Pollyannaish. 69 Though intellectually appealing,
especially against the backdrop of cyber-freedom, forcing ISPs to justify every
filtering decision would reduce or even destroy their filtering ability and thus
result in more spare. And users would contract away their right quickly, as they
do today, and silent filtering would continue.
Filtering does become problematic when it causes silent non-delivery of
wanted messages (false positives), and there is evidence that the arms race of
spam blocking is increasingly blocking legitimate messages. Because
filtering's intent is not clear, such blocking is labeled censorship by those
deleted.71 Filtering is, in a sense, censorship, but it censors what ISPs believe
64. Microsoft, Sender ID Framework Overview (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.microsoft.com/
mscorp/safety/technologies/senderidloverview.mspx.
65. Sender Authentication Widely Used To Fool Spam Defenses, CMP TECHWEB, Feb. 11, 2005,
http://www.techweb.com/wire/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=60400169.
66. See Matthew D, Sarrel, Authentic E-Mail: Smtp Authentication Holds Promise, But It's Not Yet
a Real Spam-Stopping Solution, PC MAG., Dec. 2005, at 120. However, forged authentication data can
still be valuable to filters blocking spanmers. See Deborah Radcliff, Fighting Back Against Phishing,
NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 11, 2005, at 48.
67. Yahoo!, Yahoo! Anti-Spain Resource Center: DomainKeys, http://antispam.yahoo.com/
domainkeys (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
68. CAN-SPAM Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
108th Cong., May 20, 2004 (written testimony of Ronald Scelson, Scelson Online Marketing),
http://comxnerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cftn?id=1 199&wit id=2094.
69. See David R. Johnson et al., The Accountable Internet: Peer Production of Internet
Governance, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9, 28-29 (2004). Calls for transparency are more convincing within the
context of a right to receive information, such as the one guaranteed under South African law. See S.
AFR. CONST. 1996, Bill of Rights § 16(1)(b) ("Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which
includes ... freedom to receive or impart information or ideas."); Electronic Communications and
Transactions Act 25 of 2002 s. 86 (S. Afr.) ("(1)... [A] person who intentionally accesses or intercepts
any data without authority or permission to do so, is guilty of an offence. (2) A person who intentionally
and without authority to do so, interferes with data in a way which causes such data to be modified,
destroyed or otherwise rendered ineffective, is guilty of an offence."). This right as applied to email
filtering has not been enforced however, nor has South Africa's spain law in general.
70. Spam (Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science
and Transportation, 108th Cong., May 21, 2003 (written testimony of Trevor Hughes, Executive
Director, Network Advertisers Initiative), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id =
773&wit id=2092.
71. Written Testimony of Ronald Scelson, supra note 68.
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(hopefully in good faith) their customers want deleted, and it relies upon
customer consent to keep operations running smoothly (indeed, running at all),
More importantly, ISPs have an economic incentive to deliver wanted mail and
to delete as much unwanted mail as possible. Assuming a robust and rational
ISP market, ideologically based censorship against users' will should be limited
and accidental.72 For users, however, it can be difficult to choose between ISP
policies because of filter opacity.
1131 1.n+e g s1111 .A-A L.,ua a -- -l , iiau.... puuit u..aj oLo, IIaPc s Is lmal,
servers that the compilers consider abusive and believe ISPs should block. For
example, Yale University voluntarily uses one such list compiled by Spamhaus,
and under its terms of service deletes or returns mail from blacklisted
73domains. Other mail servers incorporate these blacklists as one of many
factors in filtering mail. These lists are now compiled in only a few places,
including Russia and the U.K., because of the legal problems encountered in
the United States and elsewhere. 74 The lists are generally accurate, but can be
unfair, overbroad,75 or even bullies. 76 After being put on a blacklist, a blocked
party has virtually no legal remedy, and they must comply with the demands of
the list-maker or continue to be blocked. At times, it seems these lists have the
ability to knock entire regions, or even countries, off the email landscape on
account of the bad behavior of a few.
77
ISPs and users also use "whitelists," lists of approved senders, which ensure
that wanted mail does not get caught in the spam filters. Most whitelisting is for
known senders from whom users have opted to receive mail, but whitelisting is
also used for unsolicited mail. A successful commercial venture of this type of
whitelisting is Bonded Sender, a certifying authority that has partnered with
72. Some ISPs might have other reasons to filter. For example, a religious ISP might filter by content
or even all mail from a selected region. In this case, assuming a robust market in ISPs, the ISPs' interests
will align with those of their customers.
73. Yale Univ. Support Servs., Spam Management: RBL Rejection Process, http://www.yale.edu/
email/spam/rblprocess.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2006).
74. SPEWS is based in Russia; the Spanhaus blacklists is based in the U.K. The formerly New
Zealand-based Open-Relay Behavior-Modification System (ORBS) was shut down and its founder fled
after lawsuits regarding its listings. Brian McWilliams, Spam, the Nazi-Hunter, and Citizen Joe,
SALON.COM, Sept. 7, 2004, http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2004/09/07/spamfight/index-np.html?x.
ORBS is now three related services, two based in the U.K. and one in the United States. Kieren
McCarthy, ORBS Now Split Into Three, REGISTER (U.K.), Jun. 19, 2001, http://www.theregister.co.uk/
2001/06/19/orbsnow splitjinto_three. California-based MAPS is now part of a proprietary spare
package that is no longer freely published. MAPS has had its own share of legal troubles. See, e.g.,
Media3 Tech. v. Mail Abuse Prevention Sys., No. 00-CV-12524-MEL, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1310 (D.
Mass. 2001).
75. Troy Wolverton, Antispam Lists Bar Yahoo Stores, NEWS.COM, Nov. 26, 2002,
http://news.com.com/2100-1017-957781.html.
76. Dan llett, MCI Accused of Hosting Spam Tools, SILICON.COM, Feb. 14, 2005,
http://networks.silicon.com/ broadband/0,39024661,39127838,00.htm.
77. Michelle Delio, Not All Asian E-Mail is Spam, WIRED.COM, Feb. 19, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0, I 283,50455,00.html.
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ISPs including Hotmail.78 Bonded Sender operates using a client's current
technology, changing nothing except the recipient's spam filter settings. ISPs
promise to deliver mail sent by clients of Bonded Sender, but if complaints go
over a few per million messages delivered, then bonds posted by the senders
are cashed by a third party charity. Bonded Sender has not disclosed the
number of bonds cashed, except to say it has been very small.79 Presumably
this reflects the quality of the senders involved, allowing senders, in a sense, to
put their money where their mouths are.
As of this writing, the next wave of spam management appears to be pay-
to-play solutions. Isolated users have long used challenge-response systems
80
under which when a client receives mail from an unknown sender, it asks that
sender to expend some cost, perhaps computing cycles completing a puzzle or
perhaps some human energy typing in a code that is not machine-readable or
some other task (e.g., counting the number of puppies in the picture). This kind
of system is limited in its application and is generally used by individuals with
a tight control on their mail. This is because the system works well to prove the
intentions of, say, a lost college buddy, but it effectively cripples one-to-many
communications, such as newsletters, if users are not vigilant with whitelists.
When ISPs demand computational proof from various organizations that
depend on mass emails, the latter's messages become collateral damage in the
battle against spam.
8 1
Another implementation of the pay-to-play idea is so-called email
postage.82 Yahoo and AOL recently announced a postage scheme that allows
senders to bypass filtering for less than a penny per message, with a special
verification of the message's accuracy.8 3 Variations on this theme range from
taxes for the government,84 optional bonds cashed by recipients for abusive
78. Thomas Clabum, Microsoft Signs on for E-Mail Program: Hotmail and MSN Added to List of
Distributors that Send Legitimate E-Mail Messages, INFORMATIONWEEK, May 30, 2004, at 30.
79. Posting of Rebecca Bolin to Lawmeme, http://web.archive.org/web/20041012025052/
research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1583 (Aug. 12, 2004 at 15:30
EDT).
80. See Ed Felten, A Challenging Response to Challenge-Response, FREEDOM To T1NKER, May 19,
2003, http://www.fteedom-to-tinker.com/archives/000389.html.
81. Cindy Cohn & Annalee Newitz, Noncommercial Email Lists: Collateral Damage in the Fight
Against Spam, http://www.eff.org/wp/SpamCollateralDamage.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
82. Randall Stross, How To Stop Junk E-Mail: Charge for the Stamp, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2005, at
C5.
83. Mike Musgrove, Paid E-Mail Seen as Sign of Culture Change; Guaranteed Delivery Plans by
AOL, Yahoo Viewed as Part of End to Openness, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at D5.
84. These taxes could be on Internet traffic in general, a bit tax, or a tax per email. It might also be
possible to tax purchases made via email, though this would require tracking email to web behavior and
subsequent purchasing behavior or would depend on unreliable self-reporting. See S. Con. Res. 52,
106th Cong. (1999) (rejecting the 1999 United Nations Human Development Report's proposed global
bit tax); Bambauer, supra note 9, at 167 (describing a possible "spam tax" on purchases from spam
emails). See also William F. Fox & Matthew N. Murray, The Sales Tax and Electronic Commerce: So
What's New?, 50 NAT'L TAX J. 573 (1997) for a remarkably thorough discussion of intemet sales taxes.
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mail, 85 or payments to recipients for their trouble and cost.86 A payment system
might require postage from unknown senders, but none from whitelisted
members. 87 This kind of penalty postage would act like payments to pollute,
without requiring government intervention. It would offset the cost of spam
and focus spam efforts on the most valuable kinds of spam, but it would
disadvantage non-profit newsletters as well as senders in poor countries.
89
In fact, and to date, none of these systems has been wholly successful. A
filter will work for a while, uintl some .. sparmner o Le - it.
Blacklists are alternately underinclusive or overinclusive, and never quite fast
enough. Vigilante attacks are just not big enough. There is no question that the
market's success in blocking spam has raised costs for sparnmers, but not
sufficiently. Technical hurdles have created an escalating, expensive arms race.
B. Early Legal Solutions
In the 1990s, ISPs grew frustrated at technology's inability to stop
spanmers. Though filters were improving, ISPs resented continually being the
target of the same set of rogue spanmers. With no laws specifically addressing
spam, ISPs turned to those laws that did exist, and in the late 1990s, civil and
criminal lawsuits brought on a variety of legal theories against spammers
peaked.90 With AOL leading the way, ISPs claimed fraud related to computers,
unauthorized access and destruction of stored communications, trademark
infringement, and falsification of origin and description. 91 ISPs often won
judgments and injunctions. 92  These lawsuits against spammers were
complicated, incorporating multiple theories of common law, state law, and
federal law.
93
The landmark case of Compuserve v. Cyber Promotions addressed just such
a barrage of legal claims against a spammer, including a novel claim just short
85. This system is essentially the Bonded Sender approach described supra notes 78-79 and
accompanying text, but the bonds are cashed by recipients instead of a third party.
86. See Jim Nail, Commentary: Spammers Must Pay, NEwS.cOM, Dec. 16, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2030-1028-5125275.html; Francois-Rene Rideau, Stamps vs Spam: Postage as a
Method To Eliminate Unsolicited Commercial Email (Sept. 2002), http://fare.tunes.org/articles/
stamps.vs.spam.html. Even a more limited postal system established by contract for a few parties could
allow subsidization by advertisers, who would pay ISPs to promise delivery. Messages from Yahoo!'s
affiliates, for example, are delivered to Yahoo! inboxes by default. Users must opt out with some
difficulty from these messages. Jim Hu, Yahoo Users Fume over "Spam " Switch, NEWS.COM, Mar. 29,
2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-871730.html.
87. Shyam Sunder, A Free Market Solution to Spain, CATO.ORG, Feb. 27, 2004,
http://www.cato.org/dailys/02-27-04.html.
88. Bambauer, supra note 9, at 164.
89. Cohn & Newitz, supra note 81, at 8-9.
90. SAMORISKI, supra note 57, at 122.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 124.
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of conversion: trespass to chattels. 94 After repeated requests to stop, the
defendant spammer had continued to send large volumes of mail and had been
fairly successful at circumventing Compuserve's technical blocking measures.
The court ruled that email transmission caused sufficient damage to the servers
to make the activity illegal trespass to property, and it granted an injunction
against further mailing. This decision was a leap far out of the realm of existing
statutory or case law. 95 Though a number of victories subsequently relied on
Compuserve,96 and this doctrine seemed promising for ISPs,97 it did not last.
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi98 solidly crushed the theory of trespass to chattels for
spam. Kourosh Hamidi, an ex-Intel employee, used a list of Intel employee
email addresses to send up to 35,000 employees a targeted set of six messages
denouncing Intel; he offered and honored opt-outs, and his impact on the Intel
servers was negligible. The court ruled that the damage to the servers and
Intel's interests in its network were insufficient to support a trespass to chattels
claim. This meant that only the most aggressive spammers causing actual
damage to networks were committing trespass to chattels.
99
Other spam cases were based on the law of fraud. Before the passage of
federal law criminalizing some types of email, the FTC had pursued several
egregious cases of fraud using email. By 2002, the FTC had settled four
criminal cases using existing fraud doctrine.100 By 2004, the FTC had brought
some fifty-three cases directed at emailers, 01 all of which depended on existing
fraud law. EarthLink also had great legal success against spammers who used
accounts with stolen credit cards and phishing. °2 It won a $25 million
94. CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997). This lawsuit
included claims of unfair competition, violations of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and Virginia Computer Crimes Act. Id.
95. See, e.g., John D. Saba, Jr., Comment, Internet Property Rights: E-Trespass, 33 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 367, 376 (2002).
96. See Am. Online, Inc. v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va. 1998) (awarding summary
judgment for trespass to chattels, Lanham Act claims, and other claims); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F.
Supp. 2d 548 (E.D. Va. 1998) (awarding summary judgment for trespass to chattels and Lanham Act
claims). For similar cases won by AOL, see AOL Legal Dep't, AOL Junk E-Mail Archive,
http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/aolarchive.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
97. Fisher, supra note 33, at 386-87 (suggesting these suits would become "more prevalent" after
IMS and LCGM). This kind of trespass is still accepted for unauthorized access to websites. See Ebay,
Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (ruling unauthorized website access
by a competitor's program was trespass); Daniel Kearney, Network Effects and the Emerging Doctrine
of Cybertresspass, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 313 (2005).
98. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
99. Id.at300-01.
100. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Federal, State, and Local Enforcers Tackle Deceptive Spam and Internet
Scams, (Nov. 13, 2002), http://ftc.gov/opa/2002/1l/netforce.htm.
101. Spam (Unsolicited Commerical E-Mail): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong., May 21, 2003 (testimony of Mozelle W. Thompson,
Comm'r, Federal Trade Commission), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfin?id=773
&wit-id=2089.
102. Complaint for Plaintiff at 16, EarthLink, Inc. v. John Does (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 27, 2003)
(No. 03CV2559).
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Kentucky judgment and an over $16 million New York judgment. 10 3 However,
executing those judgments turned out to be even harder than investigating the
claims;' 0 4 two years later, EarthLink had not collected on either judgment. 10 5
The results of Microsoft's legal efforts were similar. It won six default
judgments, one summary judgment, and settled four claims, while one case was
dismissed. 10 6 The summary judgment was for $4 million against Daniel
Khoshnood who sent millions of emails claiming to be Microsoft. Microsoft
did collect some $500,000 in settlements, 10 7 but while it won around $54
million in damages, it collected very little of that figure.'0 To this day, Daniel
Khoshnood remains on the list of the top 200 spammers.
10 9
Using exiting copyright law, Habeas, Inc. devised a clever legal innovation
depending on existing email metadata, the "Habeas haiku." 10 Since the haiku
was protected by copyright and other intellectual property law, Habeas
controlled who was licensed to use it in header data and planned to sue forgers.
Habeas had hoped that this system would act like a whitelist, in effect buying
delivery of legitimate mail. Habeas did enforce its mark in several lawsuits,
proudly winning a $100,000 judgment,' but even its dedicated lawyering was
not enough. By the end of 2003, the presence of the Habeas haiku was
statistically more likely to indicate spam than a wanted message.112
By 2003 then, the law was doing little to stop spam. With only a handful of
judgments actually executed and only a handful of prosecutions seemingly
reserved for the worst offenders, the legal risk for spanmers was still virtually
nil. Spam expert John Levine noted that after a $1 billion judgment won under
Iowa state law, a $10,000 settlement would have been a better deterrent, in that
spammers "would realize somebody might actually come and get that kind of
money."' 13 That case provides an apt summary of the state of the law before
103. Ryan Mahoney, EarthLink Sues "Alabama Spammers, " BIRMINGHAM BUS. J. (Ala.), Sept. 5,
2003, at 5.
104. For a glimpse into EarthLink's investigation, see Julia Angwin, Hunting "Buffalo": Elusive
Spammer Sends Web Service on a Long Chase, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2003, at Al.
105. Richmond Eustis, New Federal Spam Law is EarthLink's Big Stick, FULTON COUNTY DAILY
REP. (Ga.), Mar. 26, 2004.
106. Matt Hines, Microsoft Awarded $4 Million in Spam Suit, NEWS.COM, July 16, 2004,
http://news.com.con/Microsoft+awarded+4+million+in+spam+suit/2100-1014_3-5272776.html.
107. Cathleen Flahardy, Software Giant Leads the Pack in Spam Eradication: Microsoft Teams
With Amazon To Fight Spammers in Court, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 2004, at 20.
108. Sprague, supra note 53.
109. The Spamhaus Project, ROKSO List, http://www.spamhaus.org/rokso/index.lasso (last visited
Jan. 29, 2006).
110. Michelle Delio, Haiku 'da Been a Spam Filter, WIRED.COM, Aug. 20, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,54645,00.html.
11. John Leyden, Habeas Wins $100k Judgement Against Spammer, REGISTER (U.K.), Apr. 7,
2004, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/04/07/habeasspamlawsuit/.
112. W.S. YERAZUNIS, THE SPAM-FILTERING ACCURACY PLATEAU AT 99.9 PERCENT ACCURACY
AND How TO GET PAST IT (2004), http://www.merl.com/reports/docs/TR2004-091 .pdf
113. Tim Gray, Spammers Slammed with $1 Billion in Fines, CIO UPDATE, Dec. 20, 2004,
http://www.cioupdate.com/news/article.php/3450161.
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federal legislation; plaintiffs lawyers hoped to be able to at least collect enough
to cover their costs.
III. CURRENT LEGAL SOLUTIONS
Federal spam law has radically changed the landscape of spam prevention.
While the law disappointed many who believed it was too weak and too
narrow, the law has effectively targeted the worst kinds of spammers. It is also
the best enforced spam law in the world, with the most success at compensating
ISPs for spamming costs and shutting down abusive spamming operations.
A. CAN-SPAM: Focusing on the Negative
Federal spam legislation was first introduced in 1999,114 and Congress
considered some fourteen spam bills over several years." 5 The bill that finally
passed had twenty-two co-sponsors in the Senate"16 and passed with a
unanimous Senate vote of ninety-seven to zero. 117 With this decisive action,
Congress attempted with national legislation to settle inconsistent state law and
reduce the volume of spam. Shortly before, California had passed laws raising
the possible fine for spamming to $1 million."i 8 Stakes and confusion were
high for anyone sending email since email addresses have uncertain and even
mobile jurisdiction; a federal law was sorely needed and perhaps the only
chance for compliance."l 9 The Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM)12 went into effect on
January 1, 2004.
CAN-SPAM's most important provision is its prohibition of "materially
false or misleading" header information and subject lines. 12 1 Before CAN-
SPAM, information falsification was not illegal, and fifty-six percent of spam
fell outside federal definitions of fraudulent mail. 122 The practices that were
(and still are) the modi operandi of spammers were not illegal until CAN-
114. Can Spam Act, H.R. 2162, 106th Cong. (1999).
115. Jacquelyn Trussell, News: Is the CAN-SPAM Act the Answer to the Growing Problem of
Spam?, 16 LOy. CONSUMER L. REv. 175, 179 (2004).
116. Can-Spam Act of 2003, S. 877, 108th Cong. (2003).
117. CAN-SPAM Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
108th Cong., May 20, 2004 (opening remarks by Sen. John McCain), http://commerce.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.c fm?id=1 199&witid=2160.
118. McNair, supra note 26.
119. Tom Spring, Spam Wars Rage, PC WORLD, Apr. 2004, at 24-25.
120. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7703-13 (West Supp. 2005). CAN-SPAM is an acronym, and quite a clever
one. Mary Whisner, What's in a Statute Name?, 97 LAw LIBR. J. 169 (winter 2005) (calling CAN-
SPAM "perhaps the cleverest statute name I have ever heard").
121. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7704(a)(1-2) (2000 & West Supp. 2005).
122. Spam (Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 108th Cong., May 21, 2003 (written testimony of Enrique Salem, President
and CEO, Brightmail, Inc.), http://commerce.senate.gov/pdf/ salem052103.pdf.
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SPAM. Unsolicited commercial email now must contain a return address and a
functioning website or email address to process opt-outs for thirty days after
receipt. 123 Following an opt-out, a sender must not send mail after ten days, and
may not transfer the address to another sender.' 24 Violations of these
requirements by using automated email address generation or collecting
addresses from public spaces are aggravated offenses subject to increased
punishments. 1
25
CAN-SPAM provides three means of enforcement. First, the FTC is
authorized to pursue fraudulent activity'26 and enforce other provisions, 127
while other federal agencies have jurisdiction over special groups of senders,
such as banks. 128 Second, state attorneys general can bring civil lawsuits for
injunctions and damages, 129 which are trebled for willful or aggravated
offenses.' 30 Finally, ISPs themselves can sue for injunctions and damages,' 3'
also subject to trebling. 132 Critics claimed that, without the right to sue,
individuals were dependent on the FTC to pursue their claims.' 33 However,
individuals may also rely on ISPs and state attorneys general to defend their
rights. If these routes are inadequate, users can also still use existing state and
federal law for private lawsuits. (Additionally, in theory, a user could set up his
own mail server, making him into an ISP with standing under CAN-SPAM.)
It is worth noting that a private right of action could however become
valuable against a user's own ISP, which could spam its recipients. 34 Spam
from an ISP or its partners, such as Hotmail's Bonded Sender messages, is just
a term of service under CAN-SPAM, 135 left entirely out of the law's scope.
This problem forces a value decision. Is CAN-SPAM trying to reduce spam to
a manageable level, or is it expressing a right to refuse information? CAN-
SPAM expresses both goals, but both are alienable: the former by not opting
out of mailings, the latter by affirming ISP filtering policies. ISP spamming has
been limited and not empirically problematic because of competition in the
market, which is probably why Congress failed to carve out an exception for
123. See id. § 7704(a)(3).
124. See id. § 7704(a)(4).
125. See id. § 7705(b).
126. See id. § 7706(a).
127. See id. § 7706(c)-(d).
128. See id. § 7706(b).
129. See id. § 7706(f).
130. See id. § 7706(f)(3)(C).
131. See id. § 7706(g).
132. See id. § 7706(g)(3)(C).
133. Matthew Yglesias, Friends of Spam, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 2004, at 8 (stating that consumers
were "blissfully unaware of how close they came to spam-free serenity before federal legislators rode to
the rescue").
134. Reduction in Distribution of Spam Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2214 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 29 (2003) (prepared statement of Chris Murray, Consumers Union).
135. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7707(c) (West Supp. 2005).
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this action. If ISPs become problematic spammers, an amendment to allow
individual or class action lawsuits against ISPs is conceivable, but fierce
competition for spam-wary customers will likely solve this problem faster than
legislation.
Finally, Senator John McCain added a special enforcement mechanism for
CAN-SPAM that holds businesses responsible for their ads136 and allows the
FTC to "follow the money."' 37 This means businesses cannot avoid liability by
delegating responsibility for advertising' 38 or hiring overseas marketing
companies. 139 This provision forces responsible advertising practices and also
creates an affirmative burden on businesses to investigate the services their
advertisers provide.
140
CAN-SPAM explicitly preempted state-specific regulations of content or
labeling requirements for commercial email. Labeling has been a
controversial issue and merits some discussion. In the years before CAN-
SPAM, the FTC had found that labeling was virtually non-existent even though
existing laws required it.142 By 2003, several states required labeling: For
example, Indiana required "ADV: ADLT" on sexually explicit commercial e-
mails, 143 while Kansas required "ADV" on all commercial mail. 144 These
requirements were filling theoretically compliant subject lines quickly.
CAN-SPAM pared labeling requirements down to one set, delegating
labeling to the FTC for rulemaking. 145 The FTC now requires a label on
"sexually oriented" material. This label, "SEXUALLY-EXPLICIT," must be
written verbatim with no deceptive encoding to trick filters. 146 Harsh penalties
for unlabeled spam should deter further unlabeled adult spam, which would
help parents and adults better filter email, 147 and this particular label might
actually attract its target audience's attention. Then again, this label might just
hurt the senders who actually comply with the law.
The FTC rejected a general spam label in a June 2005 advisory report to
136. Id. § 7705(b) (West Supp. 2005).
137. S. REP. No. 108-102, at 19-20 (2003).
138. See Charles H. Kennedy & Christine E. Lyon, The CAN-SPAM Act of2003: A New Regime
for Email Advertising, COMPUTER & INTERNET L., Feb. 2004, at 1, 3.
139. Johnson, supra note 69, at 8-9.
140. Id. at 8. The McCain Amendment has yet to be enforced. This could be because it is quite
complicated, or it could be that enforcement efforts are already at capacity.
141. S. REP. NO. 108-102, at 21 (2003).
142. FTC FRAUD REPORT, supra note 34, at 15.
143. IND. CODE § 24-5-22-8 (2) (West Supp. 2005).
144. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-6107(c)(1)(C) (2003).
145. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7704(d) (West Supp. 2005).
146. FTC Rules Implementing the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 16 C.F.R. § 316.1 (2005).
147. Reduction in Distribution of Spain Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2214 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 14 (2003) (statement of William E. Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen. of the
United States).
Vol. 24:399, 2006
Opting Out of Spam
Congress. 148 The FTC felt a more generic label, such as ADV, would hurt
businesses actually trying to comply by labeling them as advertisers for
painless filtering as well as blocking their subject line speech. 49 Critics argue
that compliance with labeling requirements effectively increases costs for
spammers. For example, advocates claim that if ninety percent of spammers
comply, their costs will increase by nine times, 150 but this ignores powerful
filters. Spammers who comply will likely have their costs increase by much
more, since obediently labeled mail will be instantly blocked by filters.
Spammers who do not comply have no cost change at all. The concept of
helpful labeling depends on the false assumption that the least valuable
spammers want to comply15 1 and also a misunderstanding of the effectiveness
of modem filtering.
Assume for a moment that filters are already ninety percent effective,
152
and a random ninety percent of spammers comply with an ADV label. For a
spam-intolerant ISP, this would lower costs for filtering, and would enable the
ISP to filter the ninety percent that is labeled plus ninety percent of the
remaining mail--or ninety-nine percent total. However, compliance is not
random, and the spammers who complied likely also sent the mail that was
most valuable and legitimate. Valuable, non-fraudulent mail would be blocked
because of its ADV label. Thus, law-abiding mailers will give up altogether,
only rogue unlabeled spam will exist, the costs of filtering will increase again,
and the most valuable speech will have been lost. Labeling certainly lowers
costs to recipients, but raises them for valuable mailers.
The most outspoken advocate of labels is Professor Lawrence Lessig of
Stanford Law School. He has proposed an ADV labeling scheme plus a small
bounty for cyber-sleuths, and was so confident about this system that he
promised to quit his job if the system was codified and did not work. 153
Representative Lofgren and Senator Corzine introduced Lessig's plan-which
would have set statutory damages of up to $10 per email and awarded the
reporter twenty percent of the FTC's fine 15 4-but the legislation failed. Lofgren
and Corzine did get a provision into CAN-SPAM calling for an investigation
148. FED. TRADE COMM'N, SUBJECT LINE LABELING AS A WEAPON AGAINST SPAM (2005),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/050616canspamrpt.pdf.
149. Joseph P. Kendrick, Note, "Subject: ADV." Anti-Span Laws Force Emerging Internet
Business Advertisers To Wear the Scarlet "S," 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 563, 565 (2003)
(arguing that an ADV-style label would hurt small businesses).
150. Andrew Leung, Spam: The Current State (Aug. 8, 2003), http://security.iia.net.au/downloads/
spam%201eung%20paper.pdf.
151. Reduction in Distribution of Span Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2214 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 7 (2003) (statement of Jerry Kilgore, Att'y Gen. of Virginia).
152. Filters are generally more effective than this, but as implemented by ISPs, their results are
secret.
153. Lessig Blog, Putting My Job Where My Mouth Is, http://www.lessig.orgfblog/archives/
2003_01.shtml (Jan. 1, 2003, 10:28 EST).
154. S. 1327, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1933, 108th Cong. (2003).
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into a policy similar to that in their bill, 155 and the FTC was given nine months
to make a report about a possible twenty percent bounty.'
1 56
Ultimately, that report did not support Lessig's view. The FTC's technical
expert on cybersleuthing concluded that individuals with no insider information
would have no valuable information about spammers' identities.' 57 The FTC's
legal expert further concluded that of the three kinds of information about
spam-forwarded emails, individual sleuthing based on those emails, and
insider information--only insider information was valuable and risky enough
to warrant bounties. 158 The first kind of information, questionable email, is
gathered in bulk from the FTC's email collection at spam@uce.gov,159 its spam
database, and the FTC's generic complaint form.' 60 The second kind of
information, sleuthing about identity, is derived by the FTC itself or determined
working with extensive ISP intelligence.' 61 Individual sleuthing contributions
were seen as not sufficiently valuable, if valuable at all, to reward. 162 The FTC
recommended rewards for insider information only, ranging from $100,000 to
$250,000. 163 This insider bounty has yet to be awarded, but it likely does
increase risk for secretive spam operations. Whereas legitimate marketers
feared a small bounty for anyone dragging them into court every day,' 64 a
bounty for insiders raises risks only for email operations with something to
hide, which is a more efficient outcome.
To be sure, CAN-SPAM did not please everyone. Spam legislation always
balances speech and privacy, freedom and costs. CAN-SPAM was criticized for
being too weak to decrease the amount of spam within a month, 165 under-
155. Tim Lemke, Spam Law Allows Bounty Hunts; Reward Idea Raises Hope for Prosecution,
Fears of Vigilantism, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2003, at C17.
156. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7710(1) (West Supp. 2003).
157. Dan Boneh, The Difficulties of Tracing Spam Email, at 10-11 (Sept. 9, 2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/rewardsys/expertrpt.boneh.pdf (concluding that without inside information,
"all but the most incompetent spammers can avoid being identified by [individual] cybersleuths").
158. MARSHA FERZIGER NAGORSKY, NAGORSKY REPORT 2-4 (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
rewardsys/expertrpt-nagorsky.pdf.
159. The FTC receives about 300,000 samples forwarded to this address by users per day. Fed.
Trade Comm'n, Spam Homepage, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/spam/report.html (last visited
Apr. 18, 2006).
160. Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Consumer Complaint Form, https://rn.ftc.gov/pls/dod/wsolcq$.
startup?ZORGCODE=PUO (last visited Apr. 18, 2006).
161. CAN-SPAM Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
108th Cong., May 20, 2004 (written testimony of Ted Leonsis, Vice Chairman, America Online, Inc.),
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=l 199&witid=3436.
162. Tim Lemke, Big "Bounty" Sought To Catch Spammers, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17,2004, at Al.
163. FED. TRADE COMM'N, A CAN-SPAM INFORMANT REWARD SYSTEM: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2004), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/rewardsys/040916rewardsysrpt.pdf.
164. Ross Fadner, Marketers Wary of FTC Call for Email Bounty Hunters, MEDIANEWSDAILY,
July 2, 2004, www.mediapost.com/PrintFriend.cfm?articleld=2580 2 4 .
165. Cameron Sturdevant, Law Has Yet To Stem the Tide: Lacking Near-Term Relief IT Managers
Must Reinforce Rules, EWEEK, Feb. 2, 2004, http://www.eweek.com/ printarticle2/0,1217,a= 117721,
00.asp (noting no difference in spam volumes weeks after CAN-SPAM went into effect).
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enforced, 166 too vague, 167 too harsh, 168 and not harsh enough.1 69 However,
CAN-SPAM has made great progress toward actually suing and collecting
damages from the worst spammers.
B. Enforcing CAN-SPAM
CAN-SPAM targets fraudulent mail, and mail sent to recipients who have
expressed lack of utility from that mail, that is, users who have opted out.
Enforcement started quickly and continues, bankrupting and imprisoning the
most egregious spammers. It has been the most effective spam law in the
world.
First, CAN-SPAM has been used to protect published email addresses via
"honeypot" accounts. While CAN-SPAM does not directly forbid scanning the
Internet for public email addresses (harvesting), if a violator of another section
used harvested addresses, the violation is aggravated and subject to harsher
penalties. 170 Mail providers have been using honeypot accounts, fictional email
accounts, to monitor spamming activity, for quite some time. Brightmail
operates some two million of these accounts in twenty countries to improve its
filtering and blocking. 17 1 Honeypot accounts are generally published in public
places, such as a website or a message board, 172 and then collected by
specialized programs called spam bots. These programs quickly run through
webpages looking for email addresses to harvest. Collectors then sell the
addresses to spamming operations.
A Chicago spain consulting firm has started an ambitious project called
Project Honey Pot to track harvesters and pressure spam accomplices. The
service is a webpage linked invisibly and thus only for robots; the page issues
an email address visible only by the robot and unique to the IP address of the
visiting robot. 173 When mail is sent to that address, both the sender and
associated sending servers can be tied to the harvesting IP addresses. To date,
Project Honey Pot has identified almost one thousand harvesters; some of these
166. DMA Calls for Greater Anti-Spam Law Enforcement, DIRECT, Mar. 22, 2005,
http://www.directmag.com/news/dma-spam032205/index.html.
167. Jeffrey D. Knowles & Gary D. Hailey, CAN-SPAM Act's "Primary Purpose" Definition
Creates Gray Area, RESPONSE, May 1, 2004, http://www.responsemagazine.com/responsemag/
article/articleDetail.jsp?id=96488.
168. Stanley A. Miller II, Spam Punishment Too Harsh, Some Experts Say, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 2004, at 4E.
169. The Spamhaus Project, United States Set To Legalize Spamming on January 1, 2004,
http://spamhaus.org/news.lasso?article=l 50.
170. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7703(b) (2004); United States Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Guidelines for
United States Courts, 69 Fed. Reg. 2169, 2172-73 (Jan. 14, 2004).
171. Gregg Keizer, Symantec, MX Logic Partner in Spain Defense, TECHWEBNEWS, Nov. 18, 2004,
http://www.techweb.com/wire/security/53700265.
172. Leung, supra note 150, at 6.
173. Project Honey Pot, About Us, http://www.projecthoneypot.org/ aboutus.php (last visited Apr.
18, 2006).
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IP addresses were not previously affiliated with spamming operations. 174
Administrators could do a few things with this kind of data. They could
block the harvesters' IP addresses or notify ISPs about the behavior of their
subscribers. Better yet, they could notify companies using the services of the
spammers that their address lists are harvested. This warning, in addition to the
McCain amendment to CAN-SPAM, should cause legitimate companies to
question their direct advertiser and to change to more legitimate (and
expensive) address-gathering techniques. Thus, clever use of CAN-SPAM
plans to cut off spam's supply lines-the lists.
Using CAN-SPAM, ISPs driven by economic and reputational incentives to
legal action have filed hundreds of lawsuits. 175 Many of these lawsuits have
already settled, 176 others are pending trial, 177 and yet others have resulted in
large default judgments.178 State attorneys general have also sued using CAN-
SPAM. 179 Those who predicted no enforcement have been proved sorely
wrong. These lawsuits target fraudulent senders and often incorporate other
fraud and intellectual property claims. CAN-SPAM has allowed ISPs more
effectively to pursue spammers with a federal civil right of action they have
embraced with gusto. 181 AOL recently won $5.3 million in summary judgment
from a former spammer, Christopher William Smith. 182 A notoriously defiant
spamming operation, Scott Richter's Optinrealbig, recently declared
bankruptcy in anticipation of a Microsoft lawsuit.'83 In the words of Richter's
174. Mike Wendland, My Honeypot Catches First Span Harvester, TECH:KNOWLEDGE: MIKE
WENDLAND'S E-JOURNAL, Nov. 20, 2004, http://mikesejoumal.com/archives/003071.php.
175. See, e.g., Saul Hansell, 4 Big Internet Providers File Suits To Stop Leading Senders of Spam,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, at Al. For a comprehensive set of clippings about CAN-SPAM lawsuits,
see Gigilaw, Giglaw.com's CAN-SPAM Library, http://www.gigalaw.com/canspam/litigation.html (last
visited Mar. 19, 2006).
176. The notorious Canadian "Head Group" settled with Yahoo, and was then sued by Microsoft
and Amazon.com. Kevin Restivo, Net Giants Sue Over Canadian Spam: Microsoft, Amazon: Ontario
Firm Alleged To Have Sent Flood of Deceptive E-Mail, NAT'L POST (Can.), Sept. 30, 2004.
177. Greg Griffin, E-Mailer Says Suits Drove It Bankrupt, DENVER POST, Mar. 29, 2005, at Cl.
178. Devon Gillespie's default judgment was $1.4 million. Zeller, supra note 22.
179. For Massachusetts, see Complaint, Commonwealth v. DC Enterprises (Mass. Super. Ct. filed
July 1, 2004), available at http://www.gigalaw.com/canspam/massachusetts-dcenterprises-2004-07-
0l.pdf; for Washington, see Firm Fined For Sending Junk E-Mail, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 7, 2005, at B5.
See also FED. TRADE COMM'N, EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE CAN-SPAM ACT: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/reports/canspam05/051220canspamrpt.pdf
[hereinafter FTC UPDATE].
180. Scott Bradner, Enforcing the Permission-To-Spam Act, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 26, 2004, at
38 ("It is likely to be the end of time before we see any effective enforcement.").
181. Press Release, Am. Online, America Online, EarthLink, Microsoft and Yahoo! Team Up To
File First Major Industry Lawsuits Under New Federal Anti-Spam Law (Mar 10, 2004), available at
http://media.aoltimewamer.com/media/newmedia/cb-press-view.cfrn?releasenum=55253838 ("Our
actions today clearly demonstrate that CAN-SPAM is alive and kicking-and we're using it to give
hardcore, outlaw spammers the boot.").
182. AOL Wins Judgment Against Spammer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at C2.
183. Griffin, supra note 177.
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father and legal counsel, "Optin is profitable but for these lawsuits. ' 84 The
final party with civil standing is the FTC, which has also filed some twenty
lawsuits.1 85 Finally, criminal enforcement of CAN-SPAM has begun in earnest.
So far, the Department of Justice has started four prosecutions, all resulting in
guilty pleas, and more investigations are underway.'
86
CAN-SPAM's enforcement compares very favorably with regimes abroad.
For one, government action is only part of the larger United States strategy to
de!n with spain, u-nlike in Australia or the U.K., where enforcement is primarily
by a government agency. The Australian Communications and Media Authority
has exclusive authority to enforce its Spam Act, and has focused on issuing a
deluge of formal warnings.' 87 The ACMA has now asked 350 companies to
stop spamming, fined a few, and charged exactly one.
1 88
CAN-SPAM's enforcement has been more effective even though it is
theoretically more difficult to implement than the blanket prohibitions on
unsolicited mail coupled with opt-in regimes imposed by the EU 189 and
Australia. 9  Though the EU requires an opt-in for all mail, the sparse
enforcement in Europe has focused only on fraudulent mail. 9 ' Appalled that
mailers could send an initial message with no penalty, critics in the EU and
elsewhere criticized CAN-SPAM's opt-out regime.' 92 In practice though, the
opt-in distinction has meant nothing, since even the strictest laws, such as the
Italian laws which include large fines and prison time, 193 have gone un-
enforced.
C. Other Laws Still in Effect
Critics of CAN-SPAM also resented its preemption of stronger state
184. Id.
185. FTC UPDATE, supra note 179, at 1.
186. Id. at A-2.
187. The ACMA has sent hundreds of warnings, issued several fines, and executed several warrants
and investigations. Austl. Comm'cns & Media Auth., Anti-Spam: Media Information,
http://www.acma.gov.au/ACMAINTER. 131174:STANDARD:893452585:pc=PC_2861 (last visited
Feb. 16, 2006).
188. Andrew Colley, Anti-Spame Uptake Slow, AUSTRALIANIT, Nov. 8, 2005, www.news.com.au/
story/0,101 17,17170522-15318,00.html.
189. Council Directive 2002/58, Directive on Privacy and Electric Communications, Council, 2002
O.J. (201) 37.
190. Spam Act, 2003 (Austl.).
191. In the Netherlands, a government agency fined a group selling copies of Mein Kampfby email
and claiming to be an anti-spain activist. Derek Sooman, Dutch Watchdog Fines Spammers:
Telecommunications Agency Begins To Enforce Country's New Ban on Spam, TECHWEBNEWS, Dec.
30, 2004, http://www.techspot.com/news/16677-dutch-watchdog-fines-sparmmers.html.
192. The Spamhaus Project, supra note 169.
193. Garante Per La Protezione Dei Dati Personali, Lo spamming a fini di profitto & un reato
[Spamming For Profit Is Now A Crime], Sept. 3, 2003, http://www.garanteprivacy.it/
garante/doc.jsp?ID=272444.
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laws. 194 For its part, Congress assessed the preemption as "minimal" since
CAN-SPAM does not preempt most of the laws previously used against
spammers. 195 In particular, its preemption excludes laws related to "fraud or
computer crime,"' 196 which many states now have.' 97 In other words, most state
spam laws are still in effect.
For example, Virginia's harsh spam laws were the most actively enforced
before CAN-SPAM; Virginia had used its criminal spam laws and its long-arm
jurisdiction twice. 19 8 This kind of law against fraudulent spammers has been
held not to be a regulation of interstate commerce, and states still have
jurisdiction over fraudulent email. 199 Virginia recently extradited a spammer
from North Carolina, Jeremy Jaynes, who had amassed a $24 million fortune,
and was sentenced to nine years in prison on a fraud conviction. 20 Virginia's
tough span laws were not preempted by CAN-SPAM. Similar laws in other
states201 have also been upheld, and so states continue the battle against
fraudulent mail. Before CAN-SPAM, only one state lawsuit had used generic
state spam laws not based on fraud,202 so state laws maintain at least their pre-
CAN-SPAM impact. Lawsuits using traditional intellectual property and unfair
competition claims also march on.203 CAN-SPAM has thus taken very little
ground from existing law.
On the other hand, CAN-SPAM has done an unparalleled job targeting
spammers with the worst mailing practices and putting them out of business.
CAN-SPAM's prohibitions on fraud and trickery cover the worst kinds of
spam. Dedicated ISPs and law enforcement are pursuing these offenders, armed
with CAN-SPAM's provisions. But there is a gentler kind of spam from more
law-abiding senders, which I argue CAN-SPAM handled inadequately, and to
which this Note now turns.
194. Samuel Lewis, Law Didn't Stop Deluge, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 22, 2004, at 23.
195. S. REP. No. 108-102, at 10 (2003).
196. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7707(b)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2004).
197. The explanation of this exception is that liability results from "sending of the e-mail plus some
other action, such as violation of contractual terms, acts of fraud or deception in connection with
initiating the transmission of the e-mail, or inclusion of fraudulent content in the e-mail message." S.
REP. No. 107-318, at 13-14 (2002).
198. Reduction in Distribution of Spai Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2214 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 9 (2003) (statement of Jerry Kilgore, Att'y Gen. of Virginia).
199. Ferguson v. Friendfinders, Inc., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (2002); see also Verizon, Inc. v. Ralsky,
203 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Va. 2002) (ruling that Virginia has long-arm jurisdiction over spammers
sending mail through Virginia networks); Tricia Bishop, Judge Affirms Spam Suits Md. Appellate Ruling
Upholds Tool Against Unsolicited E-Mail, BALT. SUN, Jan. 27, 2006, at IA (chronicling a similar result
in Maryland litigation).
200. Jonathan B. Cox, Raleigh Spammer Faces Prison Time: Jaynes Was in the Top Tier of Web
Crooks, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 14, 2004, at Al.
201. See, e.g., State v. Heckel, 93 P.3d 189 (Wash. App. 2004).
202. Proposed Final Injunction, People v. Willis, No. 1-02-CV811428 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002),
available at http://caag.state.ca.us/newsalerts/2003/03-130.pdf.
203. Heather Won Tesoriero, Microsoft Joins Pfizer To Fight "Viagra " Spam, WALL ST. J., Feb.
11, 2005, at B 1 (reporting Viagra violations via ICANN, as well as other Microsoft efforts).
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IV. COMPLETING THE PICTURE: DO-NOT-SPAM LISTS
Inboxes and email addresses have never been protected by privacy laws
20 4
or property law.20 5 Users have no right to sue, and have only an ex post remedy
for unwanted mail. CAN-SPAM has protected inboxes ex ante from the worst
kinds of spam, but ignored the rights of users to refuse unwanted advertising,
despite the success of Junk Fax and the Do-Not-Call Registry in analogous
media. This Part addresses this deficiency of CAN-SPAM, and proposes a
domain-level Do-Not-Spam Registry.
A. Mail, Fax, and Telemarketing
It is helpful to start by looking at opt-out protections for other kinds of
unsolicited commercial speech. To opt out of most advertising, such as radio
and television, a consumer can simply not pursue the communication. Other
kinds of Internet advertising, such as websites and banners, are similarly "pull"
advertising which users can avoid by not seeking it out.206 Regulations about
more invasive "push" media depend on the characteristics of the medium
involved, namely invasiveness and cost.
In the mail context, there are two ways for postal customers to opt out of
advertising mailings by notifying the post office. The first is to notify the post
office that a recipient or her children do not wish to receive "sexually oriented"
207 208
advertising. This material is defined broadly in the statute. In practice, the
post office also applies this opt-out to violence-inciting materials and some
209types of mail relating to lotteries. A consumer can also opt out of mail sent
by any sender. 210 The Postal Service will issue an order to an offending mailer
forbidding any further mails to the particular addressee, regardless of
content.211 The statute intentionally allows a subjective standard, applied at a
recipient's discretion; the Supreme Court affirmed this user-based standard
with no review by the Postal Service in a 1970 case concerning birth control
advertisements. 212 A recipient can exercise both rights by filing Postal Service
204. See Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1085 (2002).
205. See Jeremiah Kelman, E-Nuisance: Unsolicited Bulk E-Mail at the Boundaries of Common
Law Property Rights, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 363 (2004) (arguing that span should be included in nuisance
law).
206. Michael Korybut, Online Auctions of Repossessed Collateral Under Article 9, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 29, 50-51 (1999).
207. 39 U.S.C. § 3010(b) (2000).
208. Id. § 3010(d).
209. U.S. Postal Serv., Using Our Customer Service (Pub 201), http://www.pueblo.gsa.gov/
cictext/misc/postal/using..services.htm#pom (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
210. 39 U.S.C. § 3008(a) (2000).
211. U.S. Postal Serv., Postal Bulletin PB21977 of July 30, 1998, at 13, http://www.usps.com/
cpim/ftp/bulletin/1998/pb21977.pdf.
212. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 733-734 (1970).
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Form 1500.213
In 1991, Congress implemented a complete ban on unsolicited commercial
faxes, so-called Junk Faxes. 214 This law is enforced, among other ways, with a
private right of action to receive $500 damages for such faxes215 (a lucrative
hobby for the litigious and annoyed). It is possible to opt back in by soliciting
the faxes, which is an affirmative defense for the sender.
216
Automated telemarketing using pre-recorded or artificial messages is
expressly illegal,217 as is automated dialing of cellular telephones.218 Other
telemarketing is now governed by the Do-Not-Call Registry, which is an opt-
out system. 219 The Do-Not-Call Registry did face well-publicized legal
obstacles. After the logistics were in place, a federal district court ruled the
220FTC did not have the authority to establish the Do-Not-Call Registry.
Congress reacted within a week, codifying the FTC's authority.221 In the words
of Senator Charles Schumer, "[f]ifty million people can't be all wrong." 222
After the statute was passed, another district court ruled the list was
223
unconstitutional because of its treatment of non-commercial speech. A few
days later, the Tenth Circuit stayed the injunction on the list, and four months
later, the Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the list.224 The Tenth
Circuit reasoned that the list was constitutional because it (1) restricted only
commercial speech; (2) targeted privacy-invading speech; (3) was an opt-out
system; and (4) furthered a government interest in preventing abusive
telemarketing and invasion of privacy. 225 The Tenth Circuit's ruling relied on
the Supreme Court's support for opting out of physical mailings for the similar
system in telemarketing.
226
213. U.S. Postal Serv., Application for Listing and/or Prohibitory Order, Postal Service Form 1500
(July 2005), http://www.usps.com/forms/_pdf/ps 1500.pdf.
214. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(c) (2000).
215. Id. § 227(b)(3) (2000).
216. S. REP. No. 102-177, at11(1991).
217. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(l)(B) (2000).
218. See id. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).
219. Act of Sept. 29, 2003, Pub. L. No, 108-82 §1, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) 1006 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §6102).
220. U.S. Sec. v. FTC, 282 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1290-92 (W.D. Okla. 2003).
221. Act of Sept. 29, 2003, Pub. L. No, 108-82 §1, 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. (117 Stat.) 1006 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §6102).
222. Caroline E. Mayer, Call List is Again Blocked in Court: Order Comes After Congress Votes
To Protect Registry, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2003, at Al.
223. Mainstream Mktg. Servs. Inc. v. FTC, 283 F. Supp 2d 1151, 1168 (D. Colo. 2003), stay denied
by 284 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (D. Colo. 2003), stay granted by 345 F.3d 850 (10th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 358 F.3d
1228 (10th Cir. 2004).
224. 345 F.3d 850; 358 F.3d 1228.
225. 358 F.3d at 1233.
226. "We therefore categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the
Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another. If this prohibition
operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even
'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient. That we are often 'captives' outside the sanctuary of the home
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Mail, telephony, and fax, unlike email, are one-to-one communications.
These communications are differentiated in policy decisions by invasiveness
and cost. "Push" advertising to the most expensive recipient communications,
cellular phones and faxes, is flatly prohibited. Automated telemarketing's very
low marginal cost and high invasiveness also warranted a blanket ban.
However, for communications with higher barriers to entry, such as
telemarketing and mail, the law allows recipients to opt out of communications
rather than imposing a flat ban. Mail also has a special preemptive opt-out for
sexually oriented materials, despite the high cost of entry.227
How does email compare to these other media? A family interrupted during
dinner can hang up on a telemarketer, but the harm is already done.228 The
same seems to be true for an email recipient of, for example, an unwanted
pornographic commercial message. Most people do not need to see this mail to
know they do not want it, especially in categories like pornography and
prescription drugs. Also, users do not want to opt out of mail as CAN-SPAM
demands, fearing that confirming their address will cause even more unwanted
229mail. Consumers need a better way to opt out, and it should be before the
damage is done.
Indeed, surveying this landscape of varying approaches, only email allows
commercial speakers to claim an affirmative right to send that first message
despite attempts to opt out ex ante. CAN-SPAM only prohibits transmission
after a recipient opts out by using a specific sender's link in a received
communication.230 This entitlement is misplaced. Even compared to the most
reputable and expensive emailing campaign, physical mail is more than five
times the cost of email. Illogically, the medium with the least marginal cost,
email, has an affirmative right to that first communication, whereas media with
significantly higher barriers, such as telemarketing, must respect recipients' ex
ante wishes. Commercial speech should be less important than a consumer's
expressed desire to not receive the push communications.
231
Further, email imposes external costs physical mail could never tolerate.
The most notorious spammers claim response rates from only one-quarter
percent232 to two percent, 233 while the industry representative Direct Marketing
and subject to objectionable speech and other sound does not mean we must be captives everywhere."
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970).
227. DMA RATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 9 ("It is very important to keep in mind that the highest
response rate does not always translate into the highest return on investment (ROI) and vice versa.").
228. Adam Zitter, Note, Good Laws for Junk Fax? Government Regulation of Unsolicited
Solicitations, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2767, 2782 (2004).
229. FTC UPDATE, supra note 179, at A-13 to A-14.
230. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7704(a)(4) (West Supp. 2005).
231. See Baker, supra note 43.
232. Wendland, supra note 17.
233. The "Cajun Spammer," Ron Scelson, also a ROSKO known spammer, testified before
Congress as the "most disliked person in this entire room" that his company has a one to two percent
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Association (DMA) claims a .1.12% response rate. 4 Email processing
companies estimate a 0.00036% overall response rate. 235 Even when not
sending to randomly generated addresses, spam firms send to vast databases,
sometimes larger than AOL's membership 236 (in less upright cases, the AOL
membership list itself).23 7 In the best case scenario of a non-fraudulent, non-
offensive product with a high response rate, the sender, two percent of the
recipients, and those who valued reading the mail, have directly benefited. The
majority of recipients will have neutral to negative utility from annoyance,
wasted time, and processing costs. Even under this optimistic view of spam, the
vast majority of recipients have incurred unwanted costs. This group is now a
strong majority; sixty-five percent of users find spam "very annoying," and
seventy-four percent favor making it illegal.238 Even for legitimate, non-
offensive products, some users are so irritated by spam that they even send
offensive items to spammer's residences.239 This leaves one group always
benefiting from spam: the senders. And they are an isolated group, since one
advocacy organization claims that over eighty percent of spam can be traced to
about 200 known spam operations.
240
Given that analysis, a Do-Not-Spam registry would clearly find public
support. Certainly, the Do-Not-Call Registry is wildly popular. In one poll,
eighty-three percent of respondents thought the registry was a good idea, and
even sixty-six percent of those who did not plan to sign up considered it a good
idea. 24 1 The Do-Not-Spam registry is also a popular idea. Shortly after the Do-
Not-Call List was implemented in 2003, eighty-three percent of Americans
indicated that they would sign up for a similar FTC Do-Not-Spam list.242
B. Problems With Do-Not-Spam Lists
Drawing on the immense popularity and success of the Do-Not-Call list,
response rate on its products. CAN-SPAM Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 108th Cong., May 21, 2003 (written testimony of Ronald Scelson, Scelson Online
Marketing), http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfin?id=773&witid=2094.
234. DMA RATE REPORT, supra note 16, at 12.
235. John E. Dunn, Spam is Popular, Says Survey, TECHWORLD.COM, Mar 25, 2005,
http://www.itworld.com/Tech/2987/050325spampopular/.
236. David Martin, The Spammer Next Door: Kansas City's Virtumundo Tries To Shed the
Reputation that Made It a Fortune, PITCH (Kan. City), Apr. 8, 2004, available at
http://www.pitch.com/issues/2004-04-08/news/feature.html.
237. Guilty Plea in Theft ofData on AOL Users, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2005, at C3.
238. Humphrey Taylor, The Harris Poll #75: Spam Keeps on Growing, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, Dec.
10, 2003, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID=424.
239. Madigan, supra note 15.
240. The Spambaus Project, supra note 109.
241. David Krane, The Harris Poll #51: National Do Not Call Registry Popular, HARRIS
INTERACTIVE, Sept. 4, 2003, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/index.asp?PID=400.
242. Synovate, Americans Ready To Delete Spare For Good (Dec. 17, 2003),
http://www.synovate.com/current/news/article/2003/1 2/americans-ready-to-delete-spam-for-good.html.
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CAN-SPAM delegated a decision about a similar Do-Not-Email list to the
FTC. 243 This Note refers to this list as a Do-Not-Spam list because it is limited
to unsolicited commercial email. The Do-Not-Call list is an opt-out regime, like
CAN-SPAM itself.244 A Do-Not-Spam registry would act similarly in principle,
making that opt-out more methodical and making it an ex ante decision. The
FTC was empowered to start a list like the Do-Not-Call List a few months after
CAN-SPAM was passed,245 and conducted a thorough investigation with the
input of eighty experts and data from the largest ISPs.24 6 But it ultimately
rejected such a list. In its CAN-SPAM report to Congress, the FTC emphasized
that the problem was the lack of an authentication system for email.2 47 The
report also outlines a host of technical, legal, and policy problems with the list;
it is an unambiguous rejection of the proposal.248
Experts agreed on the basic problems with the list: the list would be traded
and used against those who opted out; it would be technically impossible to
"scrub" the lists and filter anonymously;249 protections for third party, or
trusted, mailers would be a disaster to implement;250 there would be no privacy
for those who signed up, and for those who did sign up, their spam problems
would increase. The FTC highlighted all of these concerns in explaining why a
list of email addresses was technically problematic, if not impossible.
251
However, the push for Do-Not-Spam Lists continued in states, with several
states using children's protective registries to limit emailing. 252 Michigan
implemented a children's registry in November 2004, while Utah's went into
effect in July 2005.253 These lists are expensive to comply with, and even
243. 15 U.S.C. § 7708(a) (2000) (requiring the FTC to report to Congress about a Do-Not-Email
registry within six months of CAN-SPAM's enactment).
244. Reduction in Distribution of Spam Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2214 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 28-29 (2003) (statement of Jerry Kilgore, Attomey Gen. of Virginia).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 7708(b) (2000).
246. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, New System To Verify Origins of E-Mail Must Emerge
Before "Do-Not-Spain" List Can Be Implemented, FTC Tells Congress (June 15, 2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/06/canspam2.htm.
247. Id.
248. FED. TRADE COMM'N, NATIONAL Do NOT EMAIL REGISTRY: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/report.pdf [herinafter FTC REGISTRY REPORT]. But see Matthew
Prince, Defending the Do-Not-Spam List, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jun. 16, 2004,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A43789-2004Junl5.html (explaining four states'
attempts to use opt-out lists of children's email addresses).
249. Hanah Metchis, Spammers Would Feast on this List, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Nov. 12, 2003, at 55;
AVIEL D. RUBIN, A REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON RESPONSES TO THEIR REQUEST
FOR INFORMATION ON ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL DO NOT E-MAIL REGISTRY (2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/expertrpts/rubin.pdf.
250. MATT BISHOP, ISSUES FOR A "Do NOT EMAIL" LIST (2005), http://www.ftc.gov/reports
dneregistry/expertrpts/bishop.pdf.
251. FTC REGISTRY REPORT, supra note 248, at 21-34.
252. See Prince, supra note 248.
253. David Kesmodel, Protecting Kids From Adult Spam: New State Initiatives To Shield Minors
from Porn, Pill Pitches Come Under Fire, WSJ.cOM, Jan. 12, 2006, reproduced at
http://www.commercialexploitation.org/news/adultspam.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2006).
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companies who do not actually do business in these states must pay for the lists
because their messages may enter the jurisdiction. Some experts estimate this
acts like a tax for bulk mailers at seven one-hundredths of a cent per address.
254
Further, the same security concerns arise with the children's list; spammers can
easily triangulate for live addresses. 255 And these laws are already under attack:
For example, an adult-entertainment trade group has gathered many free speech
256advocates to challenge the Utah law. Even if they are constitutional, such
lists are expensive to comply with and insecure. But these laws do manifest a
powerful desire for control over inboxes, especially when it comes to sexually
oriented material. This goal could be achieved with a more general Do-Not-
Spam List.
C. Domain Level Do-Not-Span Lists
There was no policy or statutory reason that the Do-Not-Spam list had to
mirror the Do-Not-Call List's structure of live addresses, such as
johnsmith@hotmail.com. It could have been a list of domains, for example
@hotmail.com addresses or @yale.edu addresses.25 7 The domain as a whole
could opt out of spam, or in a more complicated implementation opt out by
category of spam, such as pornographic spam or prescription drug spam. For
example, Hotmail could opt out of all spain, all pornographic spam, or some
258combination. Subdomains, such as kids.hotmail.com, might also have
259
additional restrictions.
Because A Do-Not-Spam List of domains (aol.com, hotmail.com, yale.edu,
law.yale.edu) is much less valuable to spammers than a list of live addresses
(mary.smith@hotmail.com, rebecca.bolin@yale.edu), this system would allow
users to declare ex ante their preferences while maintaining their privacy.260
254. Ed Felten, Michigan Email Registry as a Tax on Bulk Emailer, FREEDOM To TINKER, July 13,
2005, http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?m=200507 (July 13, 2005).
255. Id.
256. Kesmodel, supra note 253.
257. The ".com" or ".edu" is the top level domain, "hotmail" or "Yale" is the second level domain.
Here, I use "domain" to refer to what is usually a second-level domain, and I use "subdomain" to refer
to what is usually a third-level domain, such as law.yale.edu. In some cases, a second-level domain acts
more like a top-level domain, such as ".co.uk." The discussion of administering domains is beyond the
scope of this Note, but the FTC does have authority and competence to differentiate this kind of second-
level domain. Many Americans own domains within foreign top-level domains, such as ".tv" or ".md,"
and many foreign parties own American-administered domain. The complication of territorial domains
and online jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Note. I will assume all registrants are in the United
States using U.S. top-level domains.
258. In this case, Hotmail is the agent of its customers, and should not be subject to the restrictions
of the top-level domain, ".com" in this case. The FTC has the authority to handle this distinction and
should be able to restrict registration to second-level domains, or in some cases even third- or fourth-
level domains.
259. The Do-Not-Spam Registry should not function as an opt-out list and an opt-in list.
Subdomains should be able to add but not remove restrictions.
260. Reduction in Distribution of Spam Act of 2003: Hearing on HR. 2214 Before the H. Comm.
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People want to opt out of messages they dislike; sixty-four percent of recipients
would trust marketers more if they could control the kinds of communication
they received.261 The most inexpensive way to do this is by letting domains
publish their preferences.
Such a domain-level Do-Not-Spam Registry would meet Henry Smith's
critical factor for property right notifications: low information intensity.
262
Smith himself uses telemarketing and spam as examples of communications
with high externa zed costs and intn 5tvPenec that r quire hatter markers of
willingness than most rights.263 Thus a targeted list is sufficiently inexpensive
notice, given an invasive medium with high external costs. The Domain Do-
Not-Spam Registry is roughly as informationally intensive as the telemarketing
list. Do-Not-Call requires requesting the list, and scrubbing a calling list for
each phone number. There are now over 100 million U.S. telephone numbers
on the registry.264 Compare this to eighty-six million domains registered
worldwide. 265 A central database of the registered domains would thus be on
the order of the Do-Not-Call Registry, and completely workable. In addition to
the official central database, the information could also be decentralized in
domain servers (DNS servers), which already contain routing and other
information.2 66 In fact, AOL has carried such a notice for years.267 The notice
could also be within SMTP itself.268 This system lacks the privacy concerns of
the Do-Not-Call Registry, since the Do-Not-Spam Registry could be
downloaded at will. As a technical matter, a domain level Do-Not-Spam List
would be easy and inexpensive to administer.
A Domain Do-Not-Spam list could be content-specific to commercial
email, and it could include subcategories. 269 The most obvious is the "sexually
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 30 (2003) (prepared statement of Chris Murray, Consumers Union).
261. News Briefs, DIRECTMAG.COM, Feb. 1 2005, http://directmag.com/mag/marketing-news.
briefsdirectmagcom_27.
262. Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Content, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1105, 1126-29 (2003).
263. Id. at 1137-38, 1142, 1153.
264. Alena Tugend, 2 Years of Dinnertime Quiet, Thanks to the Do-Not-Call Registry, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 26, 2005, at C5.
265. VERISIGN, THE DOMAIN NAME INDUSTRY BRIEF 2 (2005), http://www.verisign.com/
static/036316.pdf. Obviously, including subdomains could raise the number of domains suitable for
registration, but the list's length would remain similar to that of the Do-Not-Call Registry.
266. Testimony of John Levine & Yakov Shafranovich before the Federal Trade Commission, In
the Matter of Report to Congress Pursuant to CAN-SPAM Act 23 (Feb. 26, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/dneregistry/xscripts/dneO4O226pm.pdf [hereinafter Levine & Shaftanovich Interview].
267. Id. at 25 ("America On-line and its affiliated companies do not authorize the use of its
proprietary computers and computer networks to accept, transmit or distribute unsolicited bulk e-mail
sent from the Internet.")
268. CARL MALAMUD, A No SOLICITING SIMPLE MAIL TRANSFER PROTOCOL (SMTP) SERVICE
EXTENSION (2004), http://rfc3865.x42.com. However, both of these proposals are subject to forgery or
malicious changing of the data. As a legal matter, their notice is not verifiable, so a centralized list is the
most reliable way to ensure the message is not distorted.
269. But see Zitter, supra note 228, at 2821-22 (arguing that opt-out systems that discriminate by
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oriented" material category already required to be labeled by the FTC.270 In
fact, this label exactly mirrors the postal service labeling requirements for
sexually oriented physical mail advertising, but without the corresponding opt-
out list.271 Other categories are possible also, such as prescription drugs, herbal
enhancements, mortgage pitches, and others. Subcategories would increase the
informational intensity because advertisers would have to determine which list
to use for each product, but would allow more refined consumer choice. For the
case of sexually explicit advertising, the list has no added informational
intensity as labeling is already required on these messages and the list is
inexpensive to process.
This Note does not propose an opt-in system like that in Europe and
Australia because this system loses the value of unsolicited speech that many
actually do want. Domain opt-out is an inexpensive way to identify users that
do not value certain kinds spain while not shutting down the speech entirely,
like the Do-Not-Call Registry. CAN-SPAM's opt-out system coupled with a
Do-Not-Call system offers the best of all worlds at minimal cost to senders, the
easy violation detection of an opt-in regime along with the freedom to receive
unrestricted emails of an opt-out regime for those who choose it.
The punishment should be larger than actual damages, but not over-high;
the $500 figure for Junk Fax seems like the high upper bound. CAN-SPAM's
272
statutory damages are either $25 or $100 per email. These damages seem
reasonable, and could either go to ISPs or to individuals. Like Junk Fax and
CAN-SPAM, consent is always an affirmative defense. As an individual cause
of action, the Do-Not-Spam Registry starts to look quite a bit like Lessig's
small bounties for mislabeled mail273 -the kind of broad, small, strict liability
action he believes will stop spain.
Though a major lobbying group proposed this domain-level implementation
274exactly, with no class action options, only one of the FTC technical experts,
Ed Felten, even mentioned this idea in his report.275 The FTC dedicated a paltry
commercial subject matter may be unconstitutional).
270. FTC Rules Implementing the CAN-SPAM Act Of 2003, 16 C.F.R. § 316.1 (2004).
271. 39 U.S.C.A § 3010(a), (b) (West Supp. 2005).
272. 15 U.S.C.A § 7703(g)(3)(A)(i) (West Supp. 2005) (setting $100 statutory damages for
fraudulent mail); Id. § 7703(g)(3)(A)(ii) (setting $25 damages for other violations, such as mailing after
opt-out).
273. See supra note 153.
274. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (Mar. 31,
2004), http://www.epic.org/privacy/junk-mail/spam/dne.html.
275. ED FELTEN, REPORT ON THE PROPOSED NATIONAL Do-NOT-EMAIL REGISTRY 3 (2004),
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/dneregistry/expertrpts/felten.pdf ("Most of the proposals would allow the
owner of an Internet domain to register the entire domain for the DNER. (The domain is the part of an
email address after the '@' symbol, e.g. aol.com, or ftc.gov.) Per-domain registration is clearly a good
idea, since it increases user convenience, and reduces the size of the DNER (by storing one registration
for an entire domain, rather than individual registrations for each address in the domain).").
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377 words to this most promising kind of list while rejecting it.276 Their
concerns were not technical, but rather under-explained legal questions. The
FTC claimed that the "ineffectiveness of the opt-in regime instituted in the
United Kingdom illustrates the inherent weakness of a domain-level Registry
without effective domain-level authentication" and that this list would put the
"government's imprimatur on ISPs' existing anti-spain policies without
reducing the scope of spam." 277 This Note next addresses these concerns and
others.
D. Practical Concerns
The Domain Do-Not-Spam List lacks the capacity to deal with the basic
enforcement problems that plague spam law. Identity-masking through
spoofing, open relays, proxies, and zombies makes spam difficult to trace, and
even then it is difficult to get data routed through other countries. 278 Spammers
are often untraceable or judgment proof, and the list cannot change that. The
list also cannot handle fraudulent or malicious spammers. This Note has argued
that CAN-SPAM already deals with this type of mail, and the Do-Not-Span
Registry is targeted at more honest mailers, an admittedly small minority at this
time.279 The list is intended to express a right to refuse unwanted advertising
from reputable mailers, and rogue spammers will disregard that right in the
same way that they disregard other laws. Low compliance and respect for the
law does not mean the values it expresses are unimportant. For that first
unsolicited message, the Do-Not-Spain List expresses a right, and is a
recipient's only legal defense.
The list itself also cannot handle the problem of users opting back into mail;
senders must keep track of that information themselves and use it as an
affirmative defense. Recipients can never be forged in SMTP, so the
responsibility is always on the sender to ensure that he is sending legal
material. 280 And senders are responsible under CAN-SPAM to verify a user's
consent when mailing to a recipient who has opted back in after opting out. Just
as in Junk Fax, the sender relies on consent as a legal defense, and as a
technical assent to mail despite a previous proscription. 28 The same situation
would arise if a user opts in to spainming despite his domain's preferences. Of
course, this can be difficult or impossible to implement given ISP filtering, but
from the sender's perspective, it is known whom he is legally permitted to
276. FTC REGISTRY REPORT, supra note 248, at 27-28.
277. Id. at 27.
278. FTC UPDATE, supra note 179, at 24.
279. A mail analysis company claims only four percent of spam was CAN-SPAM-compliant in
2005, up from three percent in 2004. Tom Spring, Spam Slayer: FTC's CAN-SPAM Report Card, PC
WORLD, Dec. 20, 2005, available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/O,aid, 123982,00.asp.
280. Levine & Shafranovich Interview, supra note 266, at 36.
281. Id.at27.
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282
mail. Senders also bear the burden of determining the category of their spain,
just as they must now determine whether they are sending sexually explicit
material.
The FTC cited the experience in the U.K. to demonstrate how ineffective a
domain-level list would be. But comparing any opt-out system to the U.K.'s
makes little sense. The U.K. is bound by an EC directive that puts a flat ban on
unsolicited commercial email, like the United States Junk Fax law, and requires
users to opt in to unsolicited mail.283 Thus, the U.K. is not administering a Do-
Not-Spam Registry because, in effect, everyone is already on it. Also, the U.K.
implementation of the directive entrusted most enforcement powers to one
government agency, the Information Commissioner, and then grossly under-
funded it.2 84 Indeed, one year later, it had not issued a single fine or charge.
285
And while there is a right of action for individuals to win actual damages, it has
been successful only once, settling out of court.286 A larger penalty or an ISP
right might have led to greater private sector enforcement, like ISP enforcement
of CAN-SPAM. Further, the Information Commissioner does not even seem to
want data about spam emails, as the only way to complain is via a five-page
written form that must be physically mailed to the commissioner. 287 Using the
U.K. as an empirical example of failure of domain-level opt-out is thus
misleading because the U.K. was not operating an opt-out system, has an
entirely different enforcement mechanism than CAN-SPAM or a Do-Not-Spain
list, and has failed to enforce its own laws.
E. Agency Concerns
As for the FTC's concerns about lending the government's imprimatur to
filtering policies, 288 CAN-SPAM was explicitly intended to be a legal
codification of best mail practices, as both a technical and business mandate.
289
CAN-SPAM intended to replace industry standards with official, legal
standards for anonymizing mail and opt-out procedures, and legally enforceable
282. This problem already exists when a user's preference does not match the ISP filter's. Hotmail
users, for example, cannot opt in to mail that is deleted by the filter.
283. Council Directive 2002/58, art. 13, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 46-47 (E.C.).
284. There were warnings before the anti-spam legislation that the Information Commissioner did
not have the resources to enforce the law. Graeme Wearden, Information Commissioner "Low on
Power" for Spam Fight, ZDNET U.K., Oct. 7, 2003, http://news.zdnet.co.uk/intemet/ecommerce/
0,39020372,39116979,00.htm.
285. Jane Wakefield, U.K. Laws are Failing To Deter Spam, BBC NEWS.COM, Apr. 21, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4466053.stm.
286. Anti-Spam Victory a Headache for Retailers, TIMES ONLINE (U.K.), Dec. 28, 2005,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,9075-1961421,00.html.
287. Information Comm'r (U.K.), Regulation 22: Unsolicited Direct Marketing by Electronic Mail,
http://www.ico.gov.uk/ems/DocumentUploads/reg%2022%20electronic%20mail.doc (last visited Apr.
20, 2006).
288. FTC REGISTRY REPORT, supra note 248, at 34.
289. FTC UPDATE, supra note 179, at 1-2.
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spam preferences are simply the next logical step.
ISPs are already deciding what speech subscribers receive, since they delete
a large majority of mail before users even see it. 29 This practice is explicitly
authorized by federal law;291 indeed it must be for mail systems to work. ISPs
are not common carriers, since they set the rules of what kind of mail they will
tolerate. 292 In fact, most ISPs have already expressed the values of the Do-Not-
Spam Registry in their terms of service.293 Some domains are even opting into
private domain level Do-Not-Spam Registry, which claims legal authority.
294
In a trivial sense, a domain that signed up for the Do-Not-Span List would
be setting the values for the user, so the user would not always be able to get
exactly what she wants. 295 This might have more symbolic meaning than an
aggressive filter, but it has little practical impact. ISPs control content like web
authors-that is, their services are even more targeted than, say, a television
channel, which also makes value judgments about what its users receive.296
These judgments, this Note argues, make the ISP the agent of the community,
not a dictator of morality.
ISPs also already act as the statutory speakers for classes of users in CAN-
SPAM. ISPs do the filtering, and ISPs-not users-have standing to sue, and
receive damages. 297 CAN-SPAM awards ISPs $25 or more per infringing
message, after users opt out.298 This reflects the fact that ISPs bear the cost of
spain and that filtering policies, in general, represent collective choices by a
community about what kind of speech they wish to receive. Complaints about
missed legitimate mail and delivered spam enforce ISP accountability.
Especially since ISPs have no authority to enforce filtering policies using
cybertrespass, a Do-Not-Spain List is the only way to give clear notice about
and enforce these choices.299 This list would be the only way email
communities can post a legally enforceable "No Solicitation" sign.
Under this regime, users could opt back into mailings because the sender is
responsible for verifying what kind of message he is sending. For example, a
sender knows if he is sending transactional messages which fall outside CAN-
SPAM, and if he could therefore ignore the domain's opt-out. 300 The same
290. See supra note 29.
291. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7707(c) (West Supp. 2005) (establishing a safe harbor).
292. Levine & Shafranovich Interview, supra note 266, at 21.
293. Howard Beales, The FTC's View on the Spam Problem, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 17,
2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2004/06/15/D12005033103252.html.
294. See http://www.optoutbydomain.com/about.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
295. Levine & Shafranovich Interview, supra note 266, at 20.
296. See Note, Impermeable Life, supra note 39, at 1330-31.
297. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7706(g) (West Supp. 2005).
298. Id. § 7706(g)(3)(A) (setting statutory damages for misleading header information at $100 per
message, and capping damages for other violations at $1,000,000).
299. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).
300. Levine & Shafranovich Interview, supra note 266, at 27.
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could hold true for a user who affirmatively opted in despite the registry. These
affirmative defenses would be akin to the same defenses in CAN-SPAM for
sending mail after an opt-out or sending transactional messages.
The Do-Not-Spain List would make consumer choice between ISP spain
policies more educated. Filtering policies are opaque in a way that the Do-Not-
Spain Registry would not be. The registry would make the market competition
more robust and rational because it would be so much more informed. The Do-
Not-Call list is somewhat confidential, and telemarketers are required to
purchase the list and scrub using their own software. 30 1 The domain opt-out
would instead be actively public. Domains would have to answer to their users
about why they have not (or have) opted out of spam or categories of spain.
The list could also alert consumers when ISPs break their own stated
preferences by contracting them into spam affiliations, like Bonded Sender
programs.
30 2
Users can and already have changed the policies of their ISPs through
competition, and users can choose an email system that has publicly announced
a viewpoint users share. Given that a majority of users are willing to switch
ISPs for better spain filtering, 303 it follows consumers would switch if the Do-
Not-Spam list selections did not match their preferences. It is easy for
consumers to get additional email addresses and change domains. 304 Thus,
consumers who value pornographic spain could seek a domain that also does.
This preference would not impose external costs on the other members of the
domain. Today, users have many mail options, and often maintain multiple
addresses. Even groups like the AFL-CIO weigh in on ISP choices. 305 The
solution proposed by this Note thus piggybacks on an already robust market.
If there are still concerns about ISP agency over filtering, an easy way to
remove the perceived imprimatur would be to give individuals a private right of
action for violations of the Do-Not-Sparn list, as they have under the Junk Fax
statute. This would allow an individual to profit from the codification of the
community's filtering policies, but it would allow users who agreed to, or even
sought out, specific opt-outs to enforce the norms in their community. When
CAN-SPAM was passed, a private right of action was already in place in Utah
and was set to begin in California. Advocacy groups proposed that the
successful private right of action against malicious junk faxes could translate to
spam. 306 For example, a technology policy group recommended a right of
301. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i), (ii) (2004).
302. Clabum, supra note 78.
303. See supra note 54.
304. Levine & Shafranovich Interview, supra note 266, at 21.
305. Business Digest, KAN. CITY STAR, Mar. 1, 2006, at CI.
306. Jane Black, Needed: A Beefier CAN-SPAM Bill; Recipients of Unwanted E-Mail Should Have
the Right To Sue, and Law Enforcement Needs More Muscle To Put the Pests Out of Business, Bus. WK.
ONLINE, Oct. 30, 2003.
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action based on this pattern, with no class action options.30 7
However, class action lawsuits against spammers were rejected by CAN-
SPAM for good reason. ISPs act as effective class representatives already,
bearing most economic costs of the class. While a group of users could
probably show substantial damages, this kind of class action has proven to be
too tempting to abuse. During Utah's brief tenure with a private right of action,
a specialized class-action plaintiff firm filed hundreds of lawsuits against "low-
hanging fruit," or established companies for accidental oversight or highly
technical violations. 308 CAN-SPAM views ISPs as the agents of users,
competent to do everything but declare their communities spain-free zones.
ISPs are not intended as recipients of messages, but the community served
by an ISP's servers is. ISPs already can and do enforce community norms,
which are checked by competition and complaints about lost mail, too much
spain, or particular kinds of spam. ISPs are not anonymous corporations; rather,
they are groups of mail recipients, often with similar values, sharing mail
servers. The Domain Do-Not-Spain Registry would allow communities to
express their ex ante preferences, as with the Do-Not-Call Registry, but in a
legally enforceable and realistic way.
CONCLUSION
Spam significantly burdens both ISPs and users, and it degrades the
medium of email. The efforts of the law and markets to block spain have made
a large impact, but have not done enough. CAN-SPAM, criticisms
notwithstanding, has done a remarkable job stopping the most abusive
spamming, and has put many fraudulent spamming operations out of business.
However, CAN-SPAM has left a gaping hole in users' rights over their
mailboxes. A user should have the right to refuse commercial speech he does
not want, and the way to do that at minimal interference to speech and minimal
cost is a Do-Not-Call Registry, but at the domain rather than the address level.
A Domain Do-Not-Spain Registry, enforced like Junk Fax and CAN-SPAM,
imposes minimal cost on senders, and best protects the values of the
community.
307. Letter from the Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. to House Commerce Comm. (Oct. 15, 2003),
available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/spam/031015cdt.shtml.
308. Reduction in Distribution of Spam Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 2214 Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 23-24 (2003) (prepared statement of Joseph S. Rubin, U.S. Chamber of
Commerce).

